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A SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE CONTRACT DOCTRINE
OF ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
"The duty to keep a contract at common law ueans a prediclian
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it-anid nothing
else."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes*
A CONTRACT, by definition, requires a promise of future performance by at
least one party.' The promisee relies on the other party's promised perform-
ance. He may enter into additional contracts or incur further expenses in
expectation of such performance. It is primarily for this right to rely that
parties contract ;2 otherwise, barter or cash sales, rather than an exchange of
promises, would suffice.
The basic purpose of a contract is therefore destroyed when one party to
the contract notifies his promisee that he will not perform.3 Instead of the
bargained-for ability to rely, the promisee has only a lawsuit against the re-
pudiator.4 Recognizing this fact, all jurisdictions, but one, allow an immediate
action for anticipatory repudiation r of certain contracts.0 An anticipatory
*HoLmFs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 175 (1920).
1. 1 CotiaN, CONTRACTS §§ 3-4 (1950); 1 WVmLIsTo, CouNTMrcrs § 1 (rev. ed. 1936).
2. "A promise is a verbal act designed as a reliance to the promisee, and so as a means
to the forecast of his own conduct" L Hand, J., in Equitable Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Western
Pacific Ry., 244 Fed. 485, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff'd, 250 Fed. 327 (2d Cir.), cert. dcried,
246 U.S. 672 (1918). See also Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S.
581 (1916); HicKs, VALUE AND CAPrrAL 124, 135 (1939) ; Llewellyn, What Price Cor.
tract?, 40 YAE L.J. 704,717 (1931).
3. 5 CoRDIN, CoNTcrs 262 (1951). This destruction of purpose is most obvious where
the injured buyer is in effect a middleman, purchasing only to resell at a profit See, e.g.,
Wheeler v. New Brunswick & Canada R.R., 115 U.S. 29 (1885), affirming 12 Fed. 377 (D.
Conn. 1882).
4. 5 ConiN, Cou=Acrs 262 (1951); Uniform Commercial Code § 2-609, comment 1
(1952).
5. 5 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1314 (rev. ed. 1937). The two leading cases on antici-
patory repudiation are Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853),
and Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900).
North Dakota and Nebraska initially rejected the anticipatory repudiation doctrine; but
they now accept it. See Stanford v. McGill, 6 N.D. 536, 72 N.W. 938 (1897), overmicd,
Hart-Parr Co. v. Finley, 31 N.D. 130, 153 N.W. 137 (1915); Carstens v. McDonald, 3S
Neb. 858, 57 N.W. 757 (1894), overruled, Lang v. Todd, 148 Neb. 726, 28 N.W.2d 434
(1947).
Massachusetts is the sole hold-out against the anticipatory repudiation doctrine. Daniels
v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874) ; P. P. Emory Mfg. Co. v. Salomon, 178 .Mass. 582, 60
N.E. 377 (1901). However, upon repudiation, Massachusetts allows the injured party to
rescind and obtain restitution. Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 74 N.E.2d 137 (1947). And
where the repudiation is joined with a present refusal to perform, he may recover future
damages. See, e.g., Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 248 Mass.
502, 143 N.E. 312 (1924). See also Centennial Electric Co. v. Morse, 227 'Mass. 486, 116
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repudiation occurs when, prior to the promised date of performance, the
promisor absolutely repudiates the contract.7 If the jurisdiction recognizes the
anticipatory repudiation doctrine with respect to the contract involved, under
present case law the injured promisee may: 1) rescind the contract and sue
for restitution; 2) treat the repudiation as a present breach 8 and immediately
sue for damages; or 3) disregard the repudiation and await the performance
date.9 If the last alternative is elected, the contract remains binding on both
parties; and the repudiator may withdraw his repudiation and perform as if
there had been no repudiation.' 0 Also, any defenses arising subsequent to the
repudiation are then available to the repudiating party." Thus, the doctrine
does not recognize breach of a contract before performance date unless both
parties agree.
N.E. 901 (1917). For a recent discussion of Massachusetts' refusal to accept the anticipa-
tory repudiation doctrine, see Note, 31 B.U.L. REv. 505 (1951).
6. For a discussion of the disagreement among jurisdictions on the question of which
contracts fall within the anticipatory repudiation doctrine, see "Executory Limitation,"
p. 87 infra.
7. This Comment will not attempt to discuss what evidentiary facts are required to
prove a repudiation. Its scope is limited to the treatment of an anticipatory repudiation
once it is found to exist.
For a general definition of what constitutes an anticipatory repudiation, see RESTATE-
MENT, CoxcTRACs § 318 (1932). The occurrence of a repudiation is a jury question. Hebron
Mfg. Co. v. Powell Knitting Co., 171 Fed. 817 (3d Cir. 1909). For examples of tile prob-
lems involved in proving an absolute repudiation, see Smoot's Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 36
(1872) ; Listman Mill Co. v. Dufresne, 111 Me. 104, 88 Atl. 354 (1913) ; Miller & Sons
Bakery Co. v. Selikowitz, 4 N.J. Super. 97, 66 A.2d 441 (1949).
8. The injured party may treat the repudiation as a present breach by bringing suit,
acting in reliance on the repudiation, or simply notifying the repudiator of his acceptance of
the repudiation. Barnebey v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 65 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1933) (accept-
ance by bringing suit) ; Bisbee Linseed Corp. v. Paragon Paint & Varnish Corp., 96 F.2d
464 (2d Cir. 1938) (acceptance by recontracting) ; McNeff v. White Eagle Brewing Co.,
294 Ill. App. 37, 13 N.E.2d 493 (1938) (acceptance by letter).
9. See, e.g., Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900) ; Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat,
195 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Carvage v. Stowell, 115 Vt. 187, 55 A.2d 188 (1947) ; Black
& Yates v. Negros-Philippine Lumber Co., 32 Wyo. 248, 231 Pac. 398 (1924).
Specific performance may also be granted in an anticipatory repudiation action if the
equity requirements are met. Dixon v. Anderson, 252 Fed. 694 (4th Cir. 1918) ; Phez Co.
v. Salem Fruit Union, 103 Ore. 514, 201 Pac. 222 (1921). Contra: Crosby v. Georgia Realty
Co., 138 Ga. 746,76 S.E. 38 (1912).
10. See, e.g., Wheeler v. New Brunswick & Canada R.R., 12 Fed. 377 (D. Conn. 1882),
aff'd, 115 U.S. 29 (1885) ; Southern Saw Mill Co. v. Herzfield, 35 Ga. App. 206, 132 S.E.
264 (1926) ; Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N.Y. 354, 29 N.E. 255 (1891) ; Shamlian v. Waxman,
80 Pa. Super. 73 (1922). See Vold, Withdrawal of Repudiation After Anticipatory Breach
of Contract, 5 TEXAs L. Rav. 9 (1926).
11 See, e.g., Landes v. Klopstock, 252 Fed. 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 570
(1918); Inman, Akers & Inman v. Elk Cotton Mills, 116 Tenn. 141, 92 S.W. 760 (1905);
Black & Yates v. Negros-Philippine Lumber Co., 32 Wyo. 248, 231 Pac. 398 (1924). And
if the injured party declines to accept the repudiation and then himself breaches the con-
tract, the repudiator may recover damages. Central Lumber Co. v. Arkansas Valley Lumber





Although all anticipatory repudiation jurisdictions apply the doctrine to
executory contracts for marriage,'- services, transportation, and sale or delivery
of goods,' 3 some of them refuse to apply the doctrine to contracts where the
promisee has fully performed.' 4 This limitation operates as follows: assume S
agrees to sell goods to B with payment to be made ninety days after shipment;
S may sue immediately if the repudiation occurs prior to shipment; but no
action will lie until the payment date if B first obtains the goods and then re-
pudiates. These courts reason that since the promisee has fully performed, he
has nothing to do but await the promisor's performance at the specified date.
Therefore, they state, a repudiation cannot affect him.' 5 To allow an immediate
action would needlessly remake the contract by granting the promisee a damage
remedy prior to the date he expected performance.'" Yet if the injured party
has not fully executed his contractual obligations, this view permits an antici-
patory repudiation action because it would be unfair, after one party has re-
pudiated, to require the other to act under the contract. 7
12. Of course, an action for anticipatory repudiation of a promise to marry is permitted
only where the breach of promise suit has not been abolished. For a compilation of the states
which have eliminated this action, see I-uPEm, PRom.a.Ns OF THE FAMILY 16S-9 (1952).
For an example of an action for anticipatory repudiation of a marriage contract, see Hollo-
way v. Griffith, 32 Iowa 409 (1871). And see I-ARTan, op. cit. supra at 165-7 for a discus-
sion of the measure of damage for breach of promise.
13. For statements of the general applicability of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine,
see Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900) ; Moore v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., 168 Fed.
496, 503 (8th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 219 U.S. 583 (1910) ; Kelly -. Security Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 186 N.Y. 16, 19, 78 N.E. 584, 585 (1906) ; Vold, Repudiation of Contracts, 5 NEM.
L. Bum.. 269,289 (1927).
14. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936) (alternate holding); Brown
Paper Mill Co. v. Irvin, 146 F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Brimmer Y. Union Oil Co., 81 F.2d
437 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 668 (1936) ; Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 74
F.2d 588 (5th Cir.), aff'd on, other grounds, 295 U.S. 632 (1935) ; Hines v. Fidelity Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 6 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) ; Manufacturers' Furniture Co. v. Cantrell,
172 Ark. 642,290 S.W. 353 (1927) ; Cobb v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 565, 51
P.2d 84 (1935); Kroch v. B.G. Operating Co., 286 IlL App. 301, 308-09, 3 N.E.2d 285
(1936) ; Mabery v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 173 Kan. 586, 250 P2d 824 (1952) ;
Huffman v. Martin, 226 Ky. 137, 10 S.W2d 636 (1928) ; Rishmiller v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
192 Minn. 348, 256 NAV. 187 (1934) ; Allen v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 228 Mo.
App. 450, 67 SAV.2d 534 (1937) ; Kelley v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N.Y. 16, 78
N.E. 584 (1906) semble. See Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 18 (1900) ; King Features Syn-
dicate v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 42 F. Supp. 107, 108 (N.D. Tex. 1941), aff'd, 133 F.2d
127 (5th Cir. 1943); Sagamore Corp. v. Willcut, 120 Conn. 315, 318, 180 At. 464, 465,
(1935).
For a criticism of this executory limitation, see Note, 4 Ox.L. REv. 112 (1951).
15. See, e.g., Parks v. Maryland Casualty Co., 59 F.2d 736 (W.D. Mo. 1932).
16. See Washington County v. Williams, 111 Fed. 801 (Sth Cir. 1901) ; Manufacturers'
Furniture Co. v. Cantrell, 172 Ark. 642, 290 SAV. 353 (1927) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. Y. Dor-
man, 51 Ga. App. 393, 180 S.E. 640 (1935).
17. See Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 19 (1900); Parks v. Maryland Casualty Co., 59
F2d 736 (W.D. Mo. 1932).
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This "executory limitation" often requires inequitable results. Thus, a cre-
ditor cannot recover from a repudiating debtor until the debt matures.' 8 Fur-
thermore, the debtor's sale of all his property, and his preparations to leave
the jurisdiction, do not alter this prohibition. 19 The creditor must await failure
to perform at the promised time before he may sue, although a successful action
at that time may be insuperably difficult.20 Strict adherence to this executory
limitation also requires an appellate court to reverse a trial court's award of
payments not yet due, even though they had already accrued at the appeal
decision date.21
Many courts which recognize the executory limitation in theory attempt to
evade it where it would require injustice. These courts often label the repudia-
tion a material breach of contract. 22 Since a material breach is a present breach,
this removes the case from the purview of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine.
Thus by manipulating labels-anticipatory repudiation vs. present material
breach-courts can govern the applicability of the executory limitation. But
they can do this only where the promisor joins his repudiation with a failure
to perform one of several installments. This combination is considered a ma-
terial breach of all further installments. And though these installments repre-
sent promises of future performance, 23 immediate suit for all damages is then
permitted. 24
18. Washington County v. William, 111 Fed. 801, 810-11 (8th Cir. 1901) ; Upham v.
Shattuck, 151 Kan. 966, 101 P.2d 901, (1940) ; Huffman v. Martin, 226 Ky. 137, 10 S.W.2d
636 (1928).
19. Moore v. Security Trust Co., 168 Fed. 496 (8th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 219 U.S.
583 (1910) (corporate dissolution); Kroch v. B.G. Operating Co., 286 I11. App. 301, 3
N.E.2d 285 (1936) (receivership) ; Upham v. Shattuck, 151 Kan. 966, 101 P.2d 901 (1940)
(insolvency through conveyance of assets) ; Huffman v. Martin, 226 Ky. 137, 10 S.W.2d
636 (1928) (sale of assets and departure from jurisdiction).
20. See cases cited note 19 supra. See also Indian River Islands Corp. v. Manufacturers'
Trust Co., 253 App. Div. 549, 2 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't 1938) (mortgagor could generally
withdraw property from mortgage so long as he met payments; allowed to do so even
though he had repudiated).
21. Leon v. Barnsdall Zinc Co., 309 Mo. 276, 274 S.W. 699 (1925); cf. Crosby v.
Georgia Realty Co., 138 Ga. 746, 76 S.E. 38 (1912).
22. See, e.g., Viglas v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 78 F.2d 829, 832 (1st Cir. 1935). rc/d, 297
U.S. 672 (1936) ; Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 Atl. 464 (1935) ; I-lodges
v. Blythe, 69 Okla. 163, 171 Pac. 16 (1918). This "material breach" label is also used in
Massachusetts to permit an immediate action. Centennial Electric Co. v. Morse, 227 Mass,
486, 116 N.E. 901 (1917).
23. The technique of calling an anticipatory repudiation a present breach if it is accom-
panied by a present refusal to perform has been severely criticized. See Roehm v. Horst,
178 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) : "What reasonable distinction per se is there between liability for a
refusal to perform future acts to be done under a contract in course of performance and
liability for a refusal to perform the whole contract made before the time for commencement
of performance." See also United Press Ass'n v. National Newspaper Ass'n, 237 Fed. 5,17,
553 (8th Cir. 1916). And many courts, without discussing the rationale, correctly label a
repudiation which occurs after performance has begun, but prior to completion, an antici-
patory repudiation. See, e.g., Bisbee Linseed Corp. v. Paragon Paint & Varnish Corp., 96
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Discovering de minimis acts yet to be performed by the injured party is
another technique used to avoid application of the executory limitation. Thus,
an action for anticipatory repudiation of a disability insurance contract has
been permitted where the plaintiff-insured was required to furnish a monthly
physical report.2 5 And another court discovered that plaintiff might be required
to "cooperate" with defendant's executor in determining what part of defen-
dant's property equalled the sum promised to the plaintiff.20
Without resort to such artificiality, a minority of courts which accept the
executory limitation simply will not apply it when irreparable harm will re-
sult.2 7 Thus, an action for anticipatory repudiation has been permitted on a
life insurance policy, 28 but not on a disability insurance policy ;O for the validity
of the latter can be tested by suing for one installment, while refusal to apply
the anticipatory repudiation doctrine to a life insurance situation would require
awaiting the death of the insured.30 Courts also have permitted an action for
F2d 464 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Continental Cotton Co. v. Mann, 117 Misc. 280, 192 N.Y. Supp.
193 (City Ct. 1921) ; Benedict v. Harris, 158 Ore. 613, 77 P2d 442 (1938). The irrationality
of this manipulation of labels is apparent in the employment contract example on p. 115
infra. Furthermore, labelling an anticipatory repudiation a present breach has caused need-
less problems to the injured party. See, c.g., text at notes 162-5 infra.
Professor Williston, however, argues that a repudiation of future performance is cor-
rectly labelled a present breach when it is accompanied by a present failure to perfurm. 5
W I IsTON, Cox-raAcrs § 1317 (rev. ed. 1937).
24. See cases cited note 22 supra.
25. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1926). But other courts have
refused to make such a finding in order to avoid the executory limitation. Kithcart v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mo. 1932) ; Rishmiller v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 192 Minn. 348, 256 N.W. 187 (1934) ; Allen v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 228
Mo. App. 450,67 S.WV.2d 534 (1937).
26. Pollack v. Pollack, 46 S.V.2d 292 (Tex. Corn. App. 1932). See also Equitable
Trust Co. v. Western Pacific Ry., 244 Fed. 485, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff'd, 290 Fed. 327
(2d Cir. 1918).
27. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916) (bankruptcy
of repudiator) ; United States v. Harris, 100 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1938) (same) ; Guitron v.
Rodriguez, 105 Cal. App. 513, 288 Pac. 134 (1930) (execution sale of repudiator's prop-
erty) ; Crabtree v. Messersmith, 19 Iowa 179 (1865) (departure from jurisdiction) ; In-
ternal Water Heater Co. v. Bums Bros., 114 N.J.L. 368, 176 AtL. 380 (1935) (repudiator
assigned property involved to third party) ; Casey v. Murphy, 143 Wash. 17, 253 Pac. 1078
(1927) (court ignored executory limitation, possibly because senseless to compel a resuit).
Cf. Cardozo, J., in N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. kiglas 297 U.S. 672, 687 (1936): "acceler-
ation of future benefits [is permitted where] essential to the attainment of present repara-
tion."
28. See life insurance cases cited note 159 infra.
29. See disability insurance cases cited note 150 inlra.
30. Compare Wollman v. Brotherhood of American Yoemen, 231 Mo. App. 36, 95
S.W.2d 645 (1936), with Allen v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 228 Mo. App.
450, 67 S.W.2d 534 (1934) ; and compare American Ins. Union v. Woodward, 118 Olda.
248, 247 Pac. 398 (1926), with Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Christian, 164 Okla. 161, 23
P.2d 672 (1932). See discussion in Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 74 F2d 583, 590
(5th Cir.), aff'd on other grotuzds, 295 U.S. 632 (1935).
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anticipatory repudiation of a promise solely for the payment of money in in-
stallments ;31 it would be inequitable to require the injured party either to sue
for each installment or to wait until all are due. But where performance of the
repudiating party, or computation of damages, is contingent upon a future
occurrence, the same courts revert to the executory limitation ;32 while it might
be unfair to both parties to require numerous suits, these courts reason that it
would be more unjust to allow an immediate action since the damages are too
uncertain to compute.
Finally, many jurisdictions totally reject the executory limitation as un-
sound.33 This is the correct view; a promisee who has fully performed should
not be refused an immediate damage remedy. No court applies the executory
limitation when the same fully-performed promisee, following an anticipatory
repudiation, brings an action for rescission and restitution.3 4 Yet, this grants
him a remedy prior to the promised date of performance. And, in fact, the
court similarly remakes a contract whenever it permits an anticipatory repudia-
tion recovery; for a promisee may then be able to obtain the consideration
for which he bargained, in the form of court-ordered damages, prior to the
date he expected performance.
The unreasonableness of the executory limitation is further demonstrated
by the result obtained. A promisee who has yet done nothing is placed in a
better position than one who has already performed; the former obtains his
remedy prior to the performance date, while the promisee who has completely
31. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916) ; Pierce v.
Tennessee Coal, I. & R.R., 173 U.S. 1 (1898) ; United States v. Harris, 100 F.2d 268 (9th
Cir. 1938); Guitron v. Rodriguez, 105 Cal. App. 513, 288 Pac. 134 (1930); Spencer v.
Kansas Casualty & Surety Co., 116 Kan. 491, 227 Pac. 357 (1924) ; Internal Water Heater
Co. v. Burns Bros., 114 N.J.L. 368, 176 Atl. 380 (1935) ; Casey v. Murphy, 143 Wash. 17,
253 Pac. 1078 (1927). See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 51 Ga. App. 393, 395, 180 S.E.
640, 641 (1935).
32. Compare Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916),
with United States v. Worley, 281 U.S. 339 (1930); and compare Spencer v. Kansas
Casualty & Surety Co., 116 Kan. 491, 227 Pac. 357 (1924), with Mabery v. Western Casualty
& Surety Co., 173 Kan. 586, 250 P.2d 824 (1952). See King Features Syndicate v. Valley
Broadcasting Co., 42 F. Supp. 107, 108 (N.D. Tex. 1941), aff'd, 133 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.
1943).
33. Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Pacific Ry., 244 Fed. 485, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
aff'd, 250 Fed. 327 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 672 (1918) ; Universal Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 129 Tex. 344, 102 S.W.2d 405 (1937). At times, courts have, without
discussing the question, allowed an action for anticipatory repudiation of a contract which
would normally fall within the executory limitation. See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916) ; United States v. Harris, 100 F.2d 268 (9th Cir.
1938); Guitron v. Rodriguez. 105 Cal. App. 513, 288 Pac. 134 (1930); Internal Water
Heater Co. v. Burns Bros., 114 N.J.L. 368, 176 Atl. 380 (1935).
34. See, e.g., Caramini v. Tegulias, 121 Conn. 548, 186 Atd. 482 (1936) ; Petschke v.
Rohdiek, 173 N.Y. Supp. 380 (App. Term. 1st Dep't 1919). Massachusetts, which does not
accept the anticipatory repudiation doctrine, permits an action for rescission upon a repudia-
tion prior to the performance date. Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 74 N.E.2d 137 (1947).
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performed cannot use the anticipatory repudiation doctrine.3 Yet, for example,
where the fully-performed promisee is a seller of goods, besides being unable
to bring an immediate action, he no longer has the goods; therefore he cannot
even secure part of the promised consideration by reselling on the market. The
anticipatory repudiation doctrine should not be so limited.30
With the exception of this executory limitation, courts agree in theory on
the operation of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine. Verbally, the plaintiff's
option to accept or reject the repudiation is adopted as basic. In practice, how-
ever, this option is often illusory because the injured party is sometimes re-
quired to accept the repudiation. Furthermore, no matter what course of action
the injured party elects, there is not even theoretical agreement on the method
of computing damages in an action for anticipatory repudiation. While all
courts purport to award that amount which will place the injured part), in as
good a position as if the contract had been performed, 37 present case law is in
hopeless confusion as to the correct just compensation method. The only
fruitful analysis of the cases can be obtained by grouping them according to
subject matter: Sales, Unfinished Goods, Insurance, Employment, and Leases.
SALES CONTRACTS
The general rule for computing damages for breach of an executory con-
tract of purchase and sale grants the injured party the difference between con-
35. See Moore v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., 16S Fed. 496, 505 (8th Cir. 1909)
(dissenting opinion): "I perceive no reason for believing that the plaintiffs, by reason
of having performed their part of the contract, [should be] in a less favorable pusition
than if the contract [were] still executory as to them."
36. See Pollack v. Pollack, 46 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932): "[T]here
is [no] logical reason that can be given for [the anticipatory repudiation doctrine's] appli-
cation to contracts still to be performed on both sides that does not apply with equal force
to those which are fully performed on one side."
UNiFopm COmmERCIAL CODE § 2-6l0's effect on the executory limitation is not clear.
Professor Williston claims that this section abolishes the executory limitation. Williston,
The Law of Sales in tle Proposed UCC, 63 HARv. L. R-v. 561, 584 (1950). However,
other analyses maintain that no change is made by the UCC See CAUF. COMMn. oN U.NI-
Fon. STATE LAWS, ANNOrATIONS TO THE PRoPosED UCC 28 (1952); RE.wrr oF PE:;.
GEN. AssEMBLY SUBCOMM. ON THE PROPOSED UCC 45 (1952); Tsx,.s LEGISLATIvE CuU.-
c., AN.uysis OF AnrxcLE 2 OF THE UCC 205 (1953).
Both interpretations are possible. The section does not specifically limit its applicability
to contracts where the injured party has not completed performance. On the other hand,
it does state that it applies only to contracts where the repudiated performance will cause
a loss which "will substantially impair the value of the contract" And according to present
executory limitation case law, a repudiation where the innocent party has fully performed
does not injure him. See cases cited note 15 stpra and accompanying text. And see Grand
Lodge Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Martin, 218 SAV. 40, 41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
This rationale could be used under the UCC to continue the executory limitation.
37. 5 CoaaN, CONTRACTS § 992 (1951); 5 WL.usTON, CoNTnAcrs § 1338 (rev. ed.
1937).
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tract price and market price on the date on which performance was due.38
Thus, computation is simple when the guilty party does not, prior to the per-
formance date, notify the other party of his refusal to perform. Upon failure
to receive performance, the innocent party may repurchase or resell on the
market.39 And the breaching party is charged for any loss.
But where there is a repudiation prior to the performance date, alternative
methods of computation are apparent. Since the promised performance date
remains unaltered in the contract, damages could still be computed as of that
date. On the other hand, under the anticipatory repudiation doctrine, the inno-
cent party has the option of treating the repudiation as a breach; if he elects
to treat it as such, damages could rationally be computed as of that date. Fur-
thermore, the rule of avoidable consequences, which imposes a duty on the
injured party to minimize damages, could be held applicable; then damages
would be computed as of the repudiation, acceptance of repudiation, or per-
formance date, depending on which date results in the least damages.
Computation Where the Injured Party Disregards the Repudiation
If the injured party disregards the repudiation and insists upon perform-
ance, most courts compute damages as of the date of performance. 40 For in
38. MCCORMACK, DAMAGES 658-9 (1935). If there is no market for the goods, the
injured seller may recover the contract price less the value of the goods to the seller;
often, because only salvage value remains, this recovery is close to the contract price. See,
e.g., Solomon v. Waterbury Brass Goods Corp., 6 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1925). The injured
buyer may recover the difference between the contract price and what it costs to obtain a
suitable substitute. Vulcan Iron Works Co. v. Roquemore, 175 Fed. 11 (5th Cir. 1909).
If this is impossible, the damages will be the difference between contract price and the
value of the goods to the buyer. Weed v. Lyons Petroleum Co., 294 Fed. 725 734 (D. Del.
1923), aff'd, 300 Fed. 1005 (3d Cir. 1924). This includes consequential damages. Ehren-
worth v. George F. Stuhmer & Co., 229 N.Y. 210, 128 N.E. 108 (1920).
39. Farish Co. v. Madison Distributing Co., 37 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1930). In that
decision, Judge Learned Hand concluded that damages should be computed on plaintiff's
recontract if he proceeded diligently to recontract in the readily available market. In
order to compute damages on the basis of a recontract, this recontract need not be made
precisely on the theoretical date of damage computation. For example, a recontract within
a reasonable time after the performance date, when damages are computed as of the
performance date, is permitted. Gussman v. Byrd Cattle Co., 11 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1926).
But too long a delay will make the recontract unreasonable; the damages will then be
computed on the market-contract difference on the performance date. California Sugar &
White Pine Co. v. Whitmer Jackson & Co., 33 N.M. 117, 263 Pac. 504 (1928). And the
injured party may use a market other than the place of delivery if there is not a readily
available market there. Ibid.
There is disagreement over whether the injured party must accept a new offer from
his repudiator. Compare Krebs Hop Co. v. Livesley, 59 Ore. 574, 114 Pac. 944, aff'd on
rehearing, 118 Pac. 165 (1911), with Key v. Kingwood Oil Co., 110 Okla. 178, 236 Pac.
598 (1925).
Throughout this comment, the statement that damages are computed as of a certain
date gives only the theoretical date for computation. In actuality, the injured party would
always be permitted to prove, and compute damages on, a recontract made other than on
the computation date, if it is reasonably close to the theoretical date.
40. Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1952); Compania
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this case the repudiation is not treated as a breach. A small minority of courts
modifies this rule: if less damages would have been incurred by recontracting
on the repudiation date, damages are computed as of that date; otherwise, the
performance date is used.4 '
Most courts rightly reject this duty to mitigate when the injured party does
not accept the repudiation.4 Such a duty compels the injured party to be a
crystal-gazer, speculating at his own risk, solely for the benefit of the guilty
party. A simple example illustrates the injustice of the mitigation rule in this
case: 4 3 B contracts to buy a quantity of rice from S, at 10c per pound at a
specified future date. B repudiates prior to the performance date when the
market price is 8c. S rejects the repudiation and awaits the performance date.
At that time, S resells on the market for 63/2c. S's loss on the resale is 3yac
per pound. If S had resold at the repudiation date, his loss would have been
only 2c per pound. Since less damage would have been incurred on a repudia-
Engraw Com'l E. Ind. v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 181 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1950); Callan
v. Andrews, 48 F2d 118 (2d Cir. 1931); Vogt Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel
& Iron Co., 297 Fed. 54 (6th Cir. 1924) ; Second National Bank of Hoboken v. Columbia
Trust Co., 288 Fed. 17 (3d Cir. 1923); Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102
F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951) ; Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117
(S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1951); Armstrong v. Walters, 2" Fed. 451
(E.D. Pa. 1915) ; Belisle v. Berkshire Ice Co., 98 Conn. 689, 120 Adt. 599 (1923) ; Mendel v.
Converse, 30 Ga. App. 549, 118 S.E. 586 (1923); Kadish v. Young, 108 11. 170 (1823);
York-Draper Mercantile Co. v. Lusk, 6 Kan. App. 629, 49 Pac. 78S (1S97) ; Bemis Bros.
Bag Co. v. Farmers' Supply Co., 19 La. App. 285, 140 So. 73 (1932); Austrian & Co. v.
Springer, 94 'Mich. 343, 54 N.W. 50 (1892) ; Fahey v. Updike Elevator Co., 102 Neb. 249,
166 N.W. 622 (1918); California Sugar & White Pine Co. v. Whitman Jackson & Co.,
33 N.M. 117, 263 Pac. 504 (1928); Krebs Hop Co. v. Livesley, 59 Ore. 574, 114 Pac. 944,
aff'd on rehearing, 59 Ore. 574, 118 Pac. 165 (1911) ; Rees v. Bowers Co., M Pa. 474, 124
AtI. 653 (192-4); Hooper v. Bell, 210 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Sloss-Sheffield
Steel & Iron Co. v. Wisconsin Foundry & Machine Co., 187 Wis. 34, 203 N.W. 746
(1925).
41. V. H. Edgar & Son v. Grocers' Wholesale Co., 298 Fed. 878 (8th Cir. 1924);
Crane Iron Works v. Cox & Sons, 28 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1928) ; West v. Pritchard, 19
Conn. 212 (1848); Long v. Conklin, 75 Ill. 32 (1874); York-Draper Mercantile Co. v.
Lusk, 45 Kan. 182, 25 Pac. 646 (1891) ; Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W.
252 (1924).
There are scattered holdings requiring computation as of the repudiation date whether
or not it will mitigate damages. Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. Beaird Co., 222 La. 627,
63 So. 2d 114 (1952); Listman Mill Co. v. Dufresne, 111 fe. 104, 88 At. 354 (1913);
Allen v. WNrolf River Lumber Co., 169 Wis. 253, 172 NAV. 158 (1919); cf. Rhodes v.
Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 17 Fed. 426 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883), rev'd on other grounds,
121 Fed. 255 (C.C.N.D. Il. 1887).
42. See Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F2d 977 (8th Cir. 1952); Callan v.
Andrews, 48 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1931); Second National Bank of Hoboken v. Columbia
Trust Co., 288 Fed. 17 (3d Cir. 1923) ; Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp.
117 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 188 F2d 569 (9th Cir. 1951); Kadish v. Young, l03 Ill.
170 (1883); Kansas Flour 'Mills Co. v. Brandt, 98 Kan. 587, 158 Pac. 1120 (1916). See
also 5 CoRnix, Co-mAcrs 263-5 (1951).
43. The facts of this e-ample are those of Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 .Mich. 255, 200
N.W. 252 (1924).
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tion date resale, S's damages are computed as of that date. But an increase in
the market price after the repudiation date would have required a different
result. Suppose the market price on the performance date had risen to 9c per
pound but that S had resold at the repudiation date. S's damages would then
be computed as of the performance date since the prior resale increased, rather
than minimized, damages.44
Under a duty to mitigate, the injured party is thus compelled to guess the
future course of a changing market, while the repudiator sits back and awaits
the performance date. At that time, the guilty party would compare the market
price on the repudiation date with that on the performance date. If computa-
tion as of the repudiation date creates less damages, he would defend against
performance date recovery on the ground of a mitigation duty ;40 if otherwise,
and the plaintiff had recontracted on the repudiation date, the defense that an
injured party may not enhance damages would suffice to require computation
as of the performance date.46 Hence, the guilty party can not lose.
Furthermore, any requirement that an injured party who has disregarded
a repudiation must mitigate prior to the performance date is contrary to the
anticipatory repudiation doctrine.47 So long as the doctrine permits an injured
party to ignore a repudiation and insist upon performance, when he does so,
damages should be computed as of the performance date. Otherwise, his option
is substantially eliminated, since the duty to mitigate may require recontract-
ing on the repudiation date. Moreover, if it be assumed that the injured party
recontracts upon repudiation in order to fulfill his duty to mitigate, but does
not wish thereby to accept the repudiation,48 the repudiator can still reinstate
the contract by withdrawing his repudiation.49 If he does so, the injured party
would be left with two contracts for the same goods 150
When the repudiation is disregarded, rejection of the mitigation duty does
not unduly burden the repudiator; for he can always minimize his damages by
44. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Cleveland Rolling-Mill Co., 17 Fed. 426, 433-4 (C.C.N.D.
Ill. 1883) (damages as of repudiaton date unless less damages as of performance date).
45. See, e.g., ibid; Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924).
46. See e.g., Rhodes v. Cleveland Rolling-Mill Co., 17 Fed. 426, 433-4 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1883), rev'd on other grounds, 121 Fed. 255 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887) ; Second National Bank
of Hoboken v. Columbia Trust Co., 288 Fed. 17 (3d Cir. 1923).
47. Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1952); Kadish v.
Young, 108 Ill. 170 (1883).
48. Admittedly, this assumption is unrealistic, since a recontract constitutes acceptance
of the repudiation. See note 8 supra. However, it helps to demonstrate the theoretical
inconsistency.
49. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
50. See Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977, 982 (8th Cir. 1952):
"There is no justification for ruling that, after the plaintiff was advised that the defendant
did not intend to perform, it must hold itself in readiness to accept performance from him
and at the same time, at its own risk and expense, buy the staves contracted for upon the
open market in the hope of reducing the defendant's liability for damages in case he




hedging.51 Assume S contracts to sell 1000 bushels of wheat to B for $1000,
delivery to be in six months. One month later, when the price of equivalent
wheat is $1100, S repudiates. B rejects the repudiation. S, believing that the
market price of wheat will continue rising, wishes to have damages computed
as of the repudiation date. He should first withdraw his repudiation. 2 Then,
by immediately contracting to purchase a similar quantity of wheat to be
delivered to B, S can limit his loss to the difference between contract price and
market price on the repudiation date.5 3 Thus, the injured party is assured of
obtaining performance of the contract. And the guilty party, if he correctly
predicts the market, can avert additional damages.
Computation Where the Injured Party Accepts the Repudiation
Even though the injured party accepts the repudiation, a substantial number
of courts still compute damages as of the performance date.5 4 Although it has
the support of most commentators,5 5 this method seems irrational. The antici-
patory repudiation doctrine permits the innocent party to treat the repudiation
as a breach; by such action he agrees to full destruction of the contract, except
for recovery of damages.5 He can no longer expect performance, and the
51. See 5 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS 265 (1951) : 'Let the repudiator use his own prophtic
judgment, take the risks that are involved therein, and get the profit or suffer the loss
that may be the result."
52. The repudiator may withdraw his repudiation at any time until it is accepted by
the injured party. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
53. S will pay $1100 for the wheat to be delivered to B. And he will receive $1000
from B. S's loss is therefore only $100, the contract-market difference on the repudiation
date. Any subsequent rise in the market will be borne by the party who contracted to
sell S the wheat for $1100. Yet, while S is thereby able to limit his damages, B will re-
ceive the performance for which he contracted.
54. In re M farshall's Garage, 63 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1933); Gentile Bros. v. Rose,
7 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1925); Second National Bank of Hoboken v. Columbia Trust Co.,
288 Fed. 17 (3d Cir. 1923) ; Cherry Valley Iron Works v. Florence Iron River Co., 64
Fed. 569 (6th Cir. 1894) ; Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 Fed. 463 (XV.D. Pa. 1831) ;
Hart v. Mfarbury, 82 Fla. 317, 90 So. 173 (1921); Phosphate Mining Co. v. Atlanta Oil
& Fertilizer Co., 20 Ga. App. 660, 93 S.E. 532 (1917); Delaware &*Hudson Canal Co.
v. Mitchell, 92 Ill. App. 577 (1901); Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. Farmers' Supply Co., 19 La.
App. 285, 140 So. 73 (1932) ; Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 814
(1889) ; Segall v. Finlay, 245 N.Y. 61, 156 N.E. 97 (1927) ; John Dimon Corp. v. Federal
Sugar Refining Co., 215 App. Div. 140, 213 N.Y. Supp. 105 (1st Dep't 1925); Phez Co.
v. Salem Fruit Union, 103 Ore. 514, 201 Pac. 222 (1921) ; Rees v. Bowers Co., 730 Pa.
474, 124 AtI. 653 (1924) ; Hopkins v. Le Cato, 142 Va. 769, 128 S.E. 55 (1925) ; Hill v.
Chipman, 59 Wis. 211, 18 N.W. 160 (1884). See Churchill Grain & Seed Co. v. Newt-in,
88 Conn. 130, 135, 89 Atl. 1121, 1123 (1914); Davis v. Grand Rapids Schuol-Furniture
Co., 41 NV. Va. 717, 721, 24 S.E. 630, 631 (1896).
55. See, e.g., 5 CoRnN, CoNTRAcrs § 1053 (1951); 5 WVUusoN, Co:.m%#-rs § 133
(rev. ed. 1937); MAYNE, DAmAGES 162-4 (10th ed. 1927); RESTA 'e MaNT, Co.%Twwrs
§ 338 (1932) ; Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L.J. 443 (190) ;
Corbin, Dantages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE LJ. 611 (1908); Vold, Re-
pudiation of Contracts, 5 N.. L. BUL.. 269, 315 et seq. (1927) ; Note, 24 Coi. L. Rv. 55
(1924); Note, 52 Hagv. L. REv. 817 (1939).
56. See text p. 86 supra.
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guilty party can no longer withdraw his repudiation.57 Yet, damages are com-
puted as of the performance date.
Where the repudiation has been accepted, computing damages as of the
performance date makes the entire doctrine nonsensical. Except where the in-
jured party wishes to void the contract without incurring liability,58 there is no
reason for him to accept the repudiation under such a rule. Unless he, the
injured party, wishes to speculate, he can not act in reliance on the repudiation
by executing a new contract.5 9 For the defendant will be liable only for damages
on the original contract as if there had been no repudiation, i.e., damages will
be computed as of the performance date.
Of course, performance date computation may aid the plaintiff. He may ob-
tain recovery for more loss than he actually incurred. Thus, in Segall v. Fin-
lay,60 seller repudiated a contract for the sale of 4000 tons of sugar at the price
of $410,000. Buyer accepted the seller's repudiation when the market price
for a similar contract was $460,400; and apparently he recontracted at that
price.61 Therefore, plaintiff's actual damage was $50,400. Yet plaintiff's re-
covery was computed on the performance date price of a similar contract, which
was $516,400. The extra $56,000 recovered was a windfall. However, it must
be remembered that this plaintiff benefited only because he correctly guessed
the market's fluctuations. True, without the repudiation, plaintiff could have
obtained the same extra profit by entering into an additional purchase contract
on the date of the repudiation for resale on the performance date. But he un-
57. See text at note 10 supra.
58. Where a repudiation is received by a party who also desires to avoid the contract
he need only accept the repudiation. All contractual duties are thereby destroyed. See
cases cited note 10 supra. And since he is not the repudiator, he cannot be sued for breach-
ing the contract. Thus, e.g., in Hadfield v. Colter, 188 App. Div. 563, 177 N.Y. Supp. 382
(1st Dep't 1919), defendant would not have been found liable for damages had he accepted
plaintiff's repudiation prior to the time it was withdrawn. Instead of so doing, defendant
disregarded the repudiation. After plaintiff-repudiator reinstated the contract, defendant
repudiated. And he was held liable for this repudiation.
59. For illustrations of the loss an injured party can incur by recontracting at a date
prior to performance date, see Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 Fed. 463 (W.D. Pa.
1881) ; and Guaranty Trust Co. v. Meer, 114 Misc. 327, 187 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1921). In
both cases, the injured party in apparent good faith recontracted upon receiving the
repudiation. However, a sudden change in the market occurred so that a performance
date computation yielded less damages than computation on the recontract. Therefore, the
court chose the former measure and in each case, the injured party suffered a huge loss.
60. 245 N.Y. 61, 156 N.E. 97 (1927).
61. Neither the opinion nor record of the case explicitly states that such a recontract
was made. However, it is clear that Segall could have recontracted on the repudiation
acceptance date; a sugar exchange where such contracts could easily be made was available
to Segall. Transcript of Record, p. 109, Segall v. Finlay, 245 N.Y. 61, 156 N.E. 97 (1927).
And since Segall had obligations to deliver the sugar to his purchaser, id. at 47, it seems
without doubt that he would recontract upon repudiation.
It is interesting to note that Segall began negotiating for a recontract seven days
before he formally accepted the repudiation, when the difference between contract and
market was only $11,200. He obtained a willing seller; yet he did not then conclude the
recontract. Id. at 27.
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doubtedly would have refrained from so doing had the defendant not repudi-
ated. The new contract was executed solely to give plaintiff the security he
lost due to the defendant's repudiation. 62 Yet, he received unexpected profits.03
Realizing these inequities of performance date damage computation, a sizable
number of courts accept other alternatives. litigation by recontracting, if it
will minimize damages, is required in some of these jurisdictions.A Similar
consequences here obtain as those already discussed with respect to the miti-
gation duty when the repudiation is not accepted. 0
Another device used is "cover." c0 0 This permits the injured party to resell
or repurchase on the market at any time after acceptance of the repudiation.
The damages recoverable are then the difference between the contract price
and the resale or repurchase price. This method produces certainty to the in-
jured party.68 But there is still no security for the repudiator. A plaintiff may
pick any intervening date between repudiation and performance to cover.
Therefore, he may choose the date of the greatest damages as his cover date.
62. The contract between Segall and Finlay was not an "exchange" contract which
is a speculative option to purchase and sell a certain amount of sugar at a stated position.
It was rather a "street market contract for future delivery" which is a cintract covering
an actual delivery of sugar. Id. at 59. Segall required the security of a recontract in
order to be sure of fulfilling his obligation to his purchaser. Id. at 47.
63. The only profit Segall expected when he entered into this contract was the differ-
ence between the cost to him under this repudiated contract and the resale price. The
court's damage computation gave him .56,000 extra profit.
64. Cox & Sons Co. v. Crane Iron Works, 5 F2d 314 (3d Cir. 1925); Golden Cycle
Mining Co. v- Rapson Coal Mining Co., 188 Fed. 179 (Sth Cir. 1911) ; Crown Products
Co. v. California Food Products Corp., 77 Cal. App. 2d 543, 175 P.2d 861 (1947) ; Mendel
v. Converse, 30 Ga. App. 549, 118 S.E. 586 (1923); Central Lumber Co. v. Arkansas
Valley Lumber Co., 86 Kan. 131, 119 Pac. 321 (1911) ; Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, Z18 Midi.
255, 200 N. W. 252 (1924). See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Mitchell, 92 Ill. App.
577, 582 (1901).
The duty to mitigate is sometimes confined to situations where the goods are regularly
bought and sold for future delivery. The damages are then computed on the difference
between the contract price and the market price for an equivalent contract. See Skcele
Coal Co. v. Arnold, 200 Fed. 393 (2d Cir. 1912).
65. See notes 42-6 supra and accompanying text. For criticism of this duty to mitigate,
see cases cited note 42 supra. And see RFSTATEmN, CoNracrs § 338, illus. 3 (1932) ;
Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L.J. 443, 454-5 (1903) ; Corbin,
Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L.J. 611 (1908); Note, 52 HInmv. L
REV. 817, 823 (1939).
66. "Cover" is any recontract made by and at the option of the injured party, in good
faith, after a repudiation.
67. Donati v. Cleveland Grain Co., 221 Fed. 168 (4th Cir. 1915) ; Wendt v. Ismert-
Hincke Milling Co., 107 Ark. 106, 154 S.W. 194 (1913); Neely v. Willard Bag & Mfg.
Co., 23 Ga. App. 598, 99 S.E. 167 (1919); James H. Rice Co. v. Penn. Plate Glass Co.,
88 Ill. App. 407 (1900) ; Struthers-Ziegler Cooperage Co. v. Farmers' Manufacturing Co.,
233 Mich. 298, 206 N.W. 331 (1925) ; Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Mulases
Co., 258 N.Y. 194 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
68. The injured party will then be assured of receiving the performance fvr which
he contracted, and at the same price. Any discrepancy in price between the original con-
tract and the recontract will be recoverable in damages from the repudiator.
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But he need not announce his cover until trial. Thus, if plaintiff's business
requires many such contracts, he may recontract at the lowest damage price
during the intervening period and yet base his cover on a similar transaction
made at the peak damage price. 9
A few courts have permitted a limited right to cover.70 Damages are then
computed on the cover price only if it results in less damages than would have
resulted had the plaintiff not covered. But this, like the duty to mitigate,"
makes a speculator of the innocent plaintiff. If he covers, he does so only at
his own risk, and solely for the defendant's benefit.
72
Many courts adopt a fifth alternative for measuring damages--the date of
repudiation acceptance. 73 Since an injured party often accepts a repudiation
69. For illustrations of situations where the injured party was regularly executing
contracts, any of which he could label his "cover" contract, see Bisbee Linseed Corp. v.
Paragon Paint & Varnish Corp., 96 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Crane Iron Works v. Cox
& Sons, 28 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1928) ; Armstrong v. Walters, 223 Fed. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1915). In
Bisbee Linseed, the injured seller also admitted that his resale price was below market
on the date he recontracted. And in Armstrong, the court found that plaintiff repurchased
on the peak damage date.
70. Morris v. Supplee, 208 Pa. 253, 57 Ati. 566 (1904) ; Goldfarb v. Campe Corp., 99
Misc. 475, 164 N.Y. Supp. 583 (City Ct. 1917).
71. See notes 42-6 stpra and accompanying text. And see note 65 supra.
Limited right to cover differs from a duty to mitigate only in that mitigation is required
while limited cover is at the injured party's option.
72. See, e.g., Morris v. Supplee, 208 Pa. 253, 259-60, 57 At. 566, 568 (1904) : "though
the buyer is not bound to supply himself before the contract date of delivery, ... , yet
he is at liberty to do so, taking the risk that he may pay more than the price for which he
may hold the vendor at the contract date of delivery . . . . [The plaintiffs] could not
charge the defendants with a higher price than that of the market on the contract date,
but, if they had bought for less, then their loss was less, and they were bound to show
how much." See also Second National Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 288 Fed. 17 (3d Cir.
1923) ; Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L.J. 443, 454-5 (1908).
73. Renner Co. v. McNeff Bros., 102 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1939); Samuels v. E.F.
Drew & Co., 292 Fed. 734 (2d Cir. 1923) ; Soya Processing Co. v. Sirota, 104 F. Supp,
428 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Georgia Wholesale Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 150 (1936);
Armstrong v. Walters, 223 Fed. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1915) ; Steel By-Products Co. v. McGee
& Cowart, 19 Ala. App. 29, 94 So. 268 (1922) ; Alaska Salmon Co. v. Standard Box Co., 158
Cal. 567, 112 Pac. 454 (1910) ; McNeff v. White Eagle Brewing Co., 294 11. App. 37, 13
N.E.2d 493 (1938) ; Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Brandt, 98 Kan. 587, 158 Pac. 1120 (1916) ;
Louisville Packing Co. v. Crain, 141 Ky. 379, 132 S.W. 575 (1910) ; Baessetti v. Shenango
Furnace Co., 122 Minn. 335, 142 N.W. 322 (1913); New Mexico-Colorado Coal
& Mining Co. v. Baker, 21 N.M. 531, 157 Pac. 167 (1916); Benedict v. Harris, 158
Ore. 613, 77 P.2d 442 (1938) ; Aetna Explosives Co. v. Diamond Alkali Co., 277 Pa. 392,
121 At. 201 (1923); Pierce Oil Corp. v. Gilmer Oil Co., 230 S.W. 1116 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) ; Cron & Dehn Inc. v. Chelan Packing Co., 158 Wash. 167, 290 Pac. 999 (1930) ;
James & Mitchell v. Adams, 16 W. Va. 245, 267 (1880). See also Roehn v. Horst, 178
U.S. 1 (1900) (recovery of market-contract difference on repudiation acceptance date
allowed even though court states performance date is time to compute damages) ; Com-
pania Engraw Com'l E. Ind. v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 181 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1950)
(same).
Among these courts, there is still dispute over the correct market for measuring
damages: the "spot" market, for contract for immediate delivery on the date of repudiation
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by covering, in many cases this is indistinguishable from the cover rule. It
yields a different result when the injured party accepts the repudiation by other
means.7 4 In such a case, even though he may subsequently cover, the measure
of damages remains the difference between contract and market on the date of
repudiation acceptance. This rule produces the same consequences as the cover
rule: certainty to the innocent party and insecurity to the repudiator.75
Uniform Sales Act 70
The Uniform Sales Act, adopted by thirty-four states,7 7 has not solved the
damage computation problem. Section 64(3), the seller's remedy, and Section
67(3), the buyer's remedy, are similarly worded: "[I]n the absence of special
circumstances showing proximate damages of a greater amount," the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the time or times the goods
ought to have been delivered shall be the measure of damages.78 But courts
have interpreted the phrase "in the absence of special circumstances" in a
variety of ways. Thus, they have been as free in the computation of damages
as if no statute were present.
The Sales Act does not specifically include an anticipatory repudiation
in the "special circumstances" category. Such an inclusion would liave elimi-
nated anticipatory repudiations from the ordinary damage computation of
market-contract difference at the performance date. Because an anticipatory
repudiation is not specifically excepted from this general rule, some courts
interpret the "special circumstances" clause to include only consequential
damages.79 They therefore hold the Sales Act to require computation as of
acceptance, or the "futures" market, for contracts for delivery on the date of performance.
While either one may generally be used, there have been decisions restricting the computa-
tion to one or the other. Compare Bisbee Linseed Corp. v. Paragon Paint & Varnish Corp.,
96 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1938) ("spot" contract), with Jebeles & Colias Confectionary Co. v.
Stephenson, 6 Ala. App. 103, 60 So. 437 (1912) ("future" contract). Since a recontract
should be as similar to the repudiated contract as possible, the restriction to a "future"
contract, where available, seems preferable.
74. A repudiation may also be accepted by bringing suit or by indicating to the re-
pudiator that it is accepted. See cases cited note & supra. If an injured party accepts the
repudiation by either of these two methods, a subsequent recontract will not affect the
damage computation.
75. See notes 68-9 supra and accompanying text.
76. Many cases decided under the Sales Act have already been dealt with in the pre-
ceding section. Since they form an integral part of the contracts case law, eliminating
them from the prior discussion would be unrealistic. The purpose of this section is not
to rehash the previous discussion, but rather to analyze the rules, if any, which the
Sales Act imposes.
77. 1 ULA, SAtas 6 (Supp. 1953).
78. UzxiFoln SALYs Acr §§ 64(3), 67(3). It is said that these sections merely codify
the common law. See Kahn v. Carl Schoen Silk Corp., 147 Md. 516, 128 AUt. 359 (1925);
Banks v. Warner, 85 Conn. 613, 84 AUt. 325 (1912).
79. See Goldfarb v. Campe Corp., 99 Misc. 475, 164 N.Y. Supp. 583 (City Ct. 1917).
Consequential damages are all damages reasonably foreseeable when the contract was
made, other than the usual contract-market difference. See 5 WuasTo., Co.TnAcrs §§
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the performance date,8 0 unless the court holds that the duty to mitigate requires
an earlier recontract.8 And a plaintiff's recontract does not then affect the
computation.82 Other courts, however, interpret the "special circumstances"
clause to include a recontract.8 3 And a large number simply disregard the
statute's apparently mandatory language.8 4 The latter two interpretations pro-
tect the plaintiff who covers reasonably, by measuring damages on the basis
of his recontract.
Assuming that a cover contract is included in the "special circumstances"
clause, a strict reading of the sections involved still prevents certainty in damage
computation. The full clause reads "in the absence of special circumstances
showing proximate damages of a greater amount."8 Thus, where plaintiff re-
contracts after accepting a repudiation, the new contract may result in "proxi-
mate damages of a greater amount" than performance date computation. Plain-
tiff would then recover damages based on the difference between the old con-
tract price and the recontract price. But if greater damages are incurred by
using the performance date market price, that larger figure would be recovered.
For the "special circumstances" clause only operates if "damages of a greater
amount" have been caused by the recontract. Plaintiff can thus speculate for
his own benefit, but at defendant's risk.8
1344-5 (rev. ed. 1937). For cases granting consequential damages, see, e.g., Perkins v.
Minford, 235 N.Y. 301, 139 N.E. 276 (1923) (performance date not used since injured
buyer could not learn of breach until later) ; Sturgeon v. Hanson, 62 N.D. 720, 245 N.W.
481 (1932) (extra expenses incurred due to late delivery by seller); Black v. Love &
Amos Coal Co., 30 Tenn. App. 377, 206 S.W.2d 432 (1947) (buyer's lost resale profits).
80. Crane Iron Works v. Cox & Sons, 28 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1928) ; Continental Grain
Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951), inodified on other grounds,
199 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117 (D.
Cal. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820
(1951) ; Segall v. Finlay, 245 N.Y. 61, 156 N.E. 97 (1927) ; Seward v. Pennsylvania Salt
Manufacturing Co., 78 Pa. Super. 319 (1922). See Churchill Grain & Seed Co. v.
Newton, 88 Conn. 130, 134, 89 Atl. 1121, 1123 (1914).
81. The Sales Act does not abrogate the common law duty to mitigate. See Crane
Iron Works v. Cox & Sons, 28 F2d 328 (3d Cir. 1928). But cf. Continental Grain Co. v.
Simpson Feed Co., 102 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951), modified on other grounds, 199
F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1952).
82. For a pointed illustration, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Meer, 114 Misc. 327, 187
N.Y. Supp. 288 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
83. Renner Co. v. McNeff Bros., 102 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1939); Soya Processing Co.
v. Sirota, 104 F.Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See Goldfarb v. Campe Corp., 99 Misc. 475,
481, 164 N.Y. Supp. 583, 587 (City Ct. 1917).
84. Compania Engraw Com'l E. Ind. v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 181 F.2d 876 (9th
Cir. 1950) ; Bisbee Linseed Corp. v. Paragon Paint & Varnish Corp., 96 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.
1938); McNeff v. White Eagle Brewing Co., 294 Ill. App. 37, 13 N.E.2d 493 (1938);
Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Cron & Dehn v. Chelan
Packing Co., 158 Wash. 167, 290 Pac. 999 (1930).
85. UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ 64(3), 67(3) (emphasis added).
86. Unless this interpretation is followed, the "special circumstances" clause is mean-
ingless. Yet, those few courts which have discussed it, see cases cited notes 79 and 83




Unlike the Sales Act, the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly codifies the
injured party's common-law right to accept or to reject an anticipatory re-
pudiation.8 7 In addition, the UCC moves toward certainty in contractual re-
lations by the addition of a "Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance"
section.88 Under this section, 2-609, one party may demand adequate assurance
of performance from the other party.8 9 If this assurance is not forthcoming
within a reasonable time, the requesting party may hold the contract repudiated.
Hence, evidentiary problems of the presence of a repudiation are greatly
diminished.90
However, the UCC further complicates the method of damage computation
for an anticipatory repudiation. It gives the injured buyer remedies different
from those which it gives to the injured seller.91 And irreconcilable sections
of the Code make buyer's actual remedy unclear.
UCC Seller's Remedy for Anticipatory Repudiation
The Code grants the injured seller the theoretical right to decide when
damages shall be computed, so long as his conduct is commercially reasonable.Y
Section 2-706 allows the seller to resell after accepting a repudiation. He may
then recover the difference between the contract price and the resale price. If
the seller fails to resell, or resells in a commercially unreasonable manner, his
damages will be computed on the performance date contract-market difference.03
Corp., 99 Misc. 475, 164 N.Y. Supp. 583 (City Ct 1917), is one case that explicitly holds
that the "special circumstances" clause does not permit the repudiator to prove that less
damages than the contract-market difference on performance date were actually incurred.
87. UxFOR COMMERCIAL CODE (hereinafter cited as UCC) § 2-610.
The effect of this section on the executory limitation is far from certain. See note 36
supra.
88. UCC § 2-609.
89. Under'existing case law, a party requesting adequate assurance of performance
may be held to have thereby repudiated the contract. See, e.g., Hadfield v. Colter, 18S
App. Div. 563, 177 N.Y. Supp. 382 (lst Dep't 1919). There, seller had notified the de-
fendant that he would not deliver the remaining installments unless defendant agreed to
pay a higher price. When defendant refused, seller delivered some. In paying for these,
defendant wrote on the check that by cashing it seller agreed to complete deliveries at the
specified prices. This statement was held to be a repudiation of the contract.
90. Present case law often makes it difficult for an injured party to be certain that
his promisor's words or acts constitute a repudiation. See authorities cited note 7 stpra.
If he incorrectly labels them a repudiation, the "injured party" becomes the breaching
party. UCC § 2-609 permits a party who is uncertain whether the contract has been
repudiated to request adequate assurance of performance. Proof at trial that no assurance
was forthcoming will be sufficient to prove the repudiation.
91. This inconsistency is recognized in the RPx.RT oF PEN. GEN. Asszmm.y Sun-
comm. ON THE PROposED UCC 57 (1952).
92. UCC § 2-706(1).
93. UCC § 2-708.
However, if trial should occur prior to the performance date, damages are to he
computed as of the repudiation date. UCC § 2-723.
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The Code also includes two minor limitations on the seller's freedom to choose
the resale date. Only identified goods may be resold, unless there is a recog-
nized futures' market. 4 And the buyer must be given reasonable notice of the
proposed resale. 5 Neither requirement effectively hinders the seller's freedom
of action.9
The repudiator who wishes to limit his damages to the difference between
contract and market on the date of repudiation obtains little help from the
Code. The seller may resell at a time thereafter when the market is lower. If
the resale is not held commercially unreasonable, the breaching buyer must bear
the burden of the market's drop.
Furthermore, the Code gives little security to the many sellers who sincerely
desire to minimize the repudiating buyer's liability. Most injured parties would
prefer keeping losses from contract repudiations to a minimum; the prospect
of prolonged litigation is a practical deterrent to increasing the loss incurred.
7
Also, the good-faith injured party wants simply to be compensated for his loss.
He may therefore resell immediately after repudiation, in the belief that less
loss will result than if he awaits the performance date. However, a sudden turn
of the market may prove him wrong. Plaintiff then risks a judicial finding that
his resale conduct was not "commercially reasonable" because hindsight shows
that, due to the market's actual fluctuation, greater damages were incurred by
the early resale. Such a result has often occurred in those jurisdictions which
presently allow recontracting if reasonable. 8 Because of this hindsight danger,
a plaintiff-seller can probably be certain of full compensation only if he awaits
the performance date to resell. But, since the UCC does not abrogate the duty
to mitigate, 99 a court may find that plaintiff should have resold prior to the
performance date in order to minimize damages. The new Commercial Code
thus does not provide the seller with the security he deserves.
94. UCC § 2-706(4) (a).
A recognized futures' market is one where goods are regularly bought and sold for
future delivery. See RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 338, comment b (1932).
95. UCC § 2-706(4) (b). However, where the goods are perishable or threaten to
decline in value, there is no notice requirement. Ibid.
96. If there is a recognized futures' market, no identification of the goods is required.
Therefore, the injured seller is free to choose the resale date, so long as not commercially
unreasonable. Furthermore, even if there is no futures' market for the goods, the seller
need only identify the goods when he desires to resell. And he can probably meet the re-
quirement of reasonable notice of resale by notifying the buyer in time for him to be
present at the resale.
97. It is very doubtful that any injured party, except an extremely vindictive one,
would desire to increase his loss in the hope of recovering the added loss in the form of
a collectible judgment.
98. See cases cited notes 41 and 64 supra.
99. The UCC does not mention the duty to mitigate. But the Uniform Sales Act,
which also disregarded this duty, was held not to have abrogated it. See Crane Iron
Works v. Cox and Sons, 28 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1928); cf. Goldfarb v. Campe Corp., 99
Misc. 475, 164 N.Y. Supp. 583 (City Ct. 1917). There is no reason to believe that the
UCC effects a change.
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UCC Buyer's Remedy for Anticipatory Repudiation
Due to irreconcilable sections, the UCC is not clear on the buyer's remedy
for an anticipatory repudiation by the seller. Three different conclusions are
possible: 1) computation as of repudiation, whether or not the repudiation is
accepted; 2) computation as of the date the repudiation is accepted except
where buyer reasonably covers, in which case damages are computed as of
cover; and 3) computation as of the performance date, unless the trial occurs
prior thereto.
Section 2-713 requires that damages be computed as of the time the buyer
"learned of the breach." It would seem that the buyer obviously learned of the
breach when he learned of the seller's repudiation. Therefore, damages would
be computed as of the date the buyer receives notice of the repudiation. But
this interpretation would make meaningless the UCC-granted option to accept
or reject a repudiation. 1' For in order to be certain of full compensation, the
buyer would have to accept the repudiation and repurchase.10 ' Undoubtedly
2-713 was not intended to apply to anticipatory repudiations. It was drafted
to meet those instances where the buyer does not learn of the breach until after
the date of performance. 1 2 For example, this might occur where the contract
calls for title to pass upon delivery of the goods to the carrier; the buyer could
not possibly know that the goods were not delivered until a reasonable time
thereafter. Yet the draftsmen's failure to consider the anticipatory repudiation
problem does not affect the section's applicability to this problem.
Section 2-713 may be reconciled with the option to accept or reject a re-
pudiation only by using the common law fiction which distinguishes a breach
from a repudiation. Case law has always used the rule that a repudiation does
not become a breach until accepted by the injured party.10 3 Assuming that the
UCC accepts this fiction, 0 damages would be computed as of the time when
the injured party notifies himself that he has accepted the repudiation; he there-
by "learn [s] of the breach !"105
100. UCC § 2-610.
This inconsistency is recognized in the REPoar OF PENN. GEN. AssF.nLY SLcom.
oN THF PRoPosm UCC 52 (1952).
101. Othenvise, the injured buyer would have his damage computed on the repudia-
tion date while his recontract, made on a different date, might cause additional loss.
102. See Tmx-s LwesLAnvE Cou :cm, ANALYSIS OF AnTzcLE 2 OF ThE UCC 248-9
(1953). For an example of the problem, see Perldns v. Minford, 235 N.Y. 301, 139 N.E.
276 (1923).
103. See 5 W.asoN, Co~mAvcrs § 1322 (rev. ed. 1937).
104. This is not a difficult assumption to make since the UCC seems to distinguish
betveen "breach" and "repudiation" by using both terms. Compare UCC § 2-713 (breach),
with UCC § 2-723 (repudiation).
105. This would then be a codification of present case law. For a repudiation may
be accepted without notifying the guilty party. See, e.g., Steele By-Products Co. V. McGee
& Cowart, 19 Ala. App. 29, 94 So. 268 (1922).
The Tex-as and Pennsylvania analyses do not accept this interpretation. Rather, they
conclude that damages are to be computed on the repudiation date. They then admit that this
is inconsistent with §§ 2-610 and/or 2-723. TEXAs LEGISLATivE Couxcu, AnALysIs OF
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Section 2-712 must be interpreted as an alternative remedy to computation
upon acceptance of the repudiation. This section grants the injured buyer an
option to cover by repurchasing. If he covers without unreasonable delay,
damages will be computed on the basis of his recontract. If he fails to cover, or
covers in an unreasonable manner, Section 2-713's computation as of the re-
pudiation acceptance date will govern.100
Section 2-723(1) is impossible to reconcile with any logical interpretation
of the buyer's remedy. It states that if an action for anticipatory repudiation
comes to trial prior to the performance date, damages shall be based on the
date the injured party learned of the repudiation. This section's obvious pur-
pose is to avoid the difficulty of approximating a future market.10 7 But this
difficulty would be present only if, without this section, damages were computed
as of a date subsequent to the trial. This could never occur if damages were
based on the repudiation acceptance or cover dates; by definition, these dates
must occur prior to the trial.'0 8 Therefore, the converse of the section must be
implied: if the trial occurs after the performance date, damages shall be com-
puted as of the performance date. But this is diametrically contrary to Sections
2-713 and 2-712, which seem to require damages based either on the date of
repudiation acceptance or cover.10 Section 2-723(1) did not appear in the
very early drafts of the Code.1°° Apparently it was added to eliminate a prob-
lem not actually present.
Because of these conflicting sections, buyer's damage recovery under the
UCC is uncertain. The most probable of the possible alternatives requires
computation as of the time the repudiation is accepted, except where buyer
covers reasonably, in which case damages are computed as of cover.'1 1 This
ARTIcLE 2 OF THE UCC 249 (1953); Report of PENN. GEN. AssEMBLY SVBCOMM. ON THE
PROPOSED UCC 52 (1953).
106. See UCC § 2-713, comment 5.
107. See UCC § 2-723, comment.
108. Bringing suit for anticipatory repudiation of a contract constitutes acceptance
of the repudiation. See, e.g., Barnebey v. Barron S. Collier, Inc., 65 F.2d 864 (8th Cir.
1933). Therefore, acceptance of the repudiation must occur prior to trial. And, in order
to use a cover recontract for computation of damages, it must be pleaded. Therefore, cover
also must occur prior to trial.
109. See text at notes 100-06 supra. Both the Texas and Pennsylvania Commissions
recognize this inconsistency in their analyses. See note 105 supra. But the Pennsylvania
analysis seems to have misunderstood the point completely. It claims that § 2-723 is
necessary because of the § 2-610 option to await the performance date. REPORT or PENN.
GEN. ASSE-MBLY SUBCOMM. ON THE PROPOSED UCC 56 (1952). But once the injured party
awaits performance date, suit is no longer for anticipatory repudiation; rather, it is for
present breach. Therefore, § 2-723 would not be applicable in that case.
110. See UNIFORm REvISED SALES AcT § 65 (2d Draft, 1941). That section was en-
titled "Determination and Proof of Market Price," but no mention of anticipatory repudia-
tion was included. UCC § 2-723, "Proof of Market Price: Time and Place," is similar
in substance except for the inclusion of proof of price in an anticipatory repudiation
situation.
111. If the repudiation is not accepted, no breach occurs until the present breach on
the performance date. Damages will then be computed as of that date. UCC § 2-713.
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conclusion is supported by another provision of the UCC related to the antici-
patory repudiation doctrine: Section 2-609. By permitting an aggrieved party
to insist upon adequate assurance of performance, this section clearly con-
templates that the injured party may wish to recontract immediately upon re-
ceiving a repudiation."' He will thereby insure performance without the pos-
sibility of additional loss. But this conclusion is necessarily speculative. A new
statute should not be so ambiguous." 3
The UCC does make some progress, at least for the buyer-plaintiff, if this
interpretation is followed. He will be fully protected if he recontracts in a
reasonable manner. But he will still be in doubt if he disregards the repudia-
tion. For a court may find that he had a duty to mitigate by repurchasing
immediately at repudiation; in this situation, the common law duty to mitigate
damages is not altered by the UCC.114
Furthermore, the UCC gives very little security to the repudiating seller.
His repudiation does not affect damage computation until the buyer accepts it.
Until then, the seller faces the danger of greater damages from a rising market.
And the seller cannot feel secure even after acceptance of his repudiation unless
acceptance is by cover; for cover at a later date may increase the damages. 11
It was to avoid this threat of increased damages, as well as to forewarn the
buyer, that seller notified buyer of his repudiation. Yet, he remains at the
market's mercy. Business practices deserve more certainty than this affords.
UNFINIsED GoODS CONTPUCTrS 110
Existing case law substantially eliminates the injured seller's 117 option to
accept or reject a repudiation where the goods ordered are as yet unfinished." 8
112. See UCC § 2-609, comment 1: "[A] buyer who believes that the seller's de-
liveries have become uncertain cannot safely wait for the due date of performance when
he has been buying to assure himself of materials for his current manufacturing or to
replenish his stock of merchandise."
113. The resultant confusion is made obvious by the difficulties of the Te.as and
Pennsylvania Committees which analyzed the UCC. See notes 100, 105, and 109 Mtpra.
114. See note 99 supra.
115. Even after accepting the repudiation, the injured buyer may cover and have his
damages computed on that recontract. UCC § 2-712.
116. For want of a better label, this section is titled "Unfinished Goods Contracts."
It includes any contract covering identifiable goods which, at the repudiation, have not
been completed. Included in this category are: 1) goods not fully manufactured; 2) goods
not yet purchased by the seller for resale to the repudiator; 3) goods not yet delivered to
the repudiator where a sizable delivery expense is involved.
117. By definition, repudiation of an unfinished goods contract requires that the seller
be the injured party. If the seller repudiates, it is treated as an ordinary sales contract.
118. Hencldey v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264 (1887); Rocdngham County v.
Luten Bridge Co., 35 F2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929) ; Skeele Coal v. Arnold, 20D Fed. 393 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 226 U.S. 612 (1912) ; Kingman & Co. v. Western Manufacturing Co.,
92 Fed. 486 (8th Cir. 1899), aff'd, 170 U.S. 675 (1890) ; David D. Joseph Co. v. United States,
82 F. Supp. 345 (Ct. Cl. 1949) ; Atldnson v. District Bond Co., 5 Cal. App. 2d 738, 43 P2d
867 (1935); King v. Rhodes, 47 App. D.C. 316 (1918); Poinsettea Dairy Products v.
Wessel Co., 123 Fla. 120, 166 So. 306 (1936); Holston Box & Lumber Co. v. Vonberg &
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For the duty to mitigate prevents an injured party from enhancing his damages.
Therefore, seller cannot continue performance where a reasonable estimate
would indicate that damages, measured by the difference between contract price
and market price of the finished goods, would be greater than the expenses
already incurred plus lost profits. n 9 And, if the goods are finished at the time
of repudiation, seller can not ship the goods to the place of delivery when addi-
tional damages would thus result. 20 Furthermore, the mitigation duty may re-
quire affirmative action by the injured party. Unless the repudiated contract
represents a "lost opportunity,' 2' he will be held to have obtained a new con-
tract for his now free time. And his damages must be reduced by any profits
on this new contract.
1 22
Bates, 34 Ga. App. 298, 129 S.E. 562 (1925); James H. Rice Co. v. Penn Plate Glass Co.,
88 Ill. App. 407 (1900); Hollerbach & May Contract Co. v. Wilkins, 130 Ky. 51, 112 S.W.
1126 (1908); Urgent v. Mairs, 130 Mich. 609, 90 N.W. 423 (1902) ; Gibbons v. Bente,
51 Minn. 499, 53 N.W. 756 (1892) ; American Publishing & Engraving Co. v. Walker, 87
Mo. App. 503 (1901) ; Baches v. Schlick, 82 Neb. 289, 117 N.W. 707 (1908); Masterson
v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill (N.Y.) 61 (1845); Heiser v. Mears, 120 N.C. 443, 27 S.E.
117 (1897) ; Davis v. Bronson, 2 N.D. 300, 50 N.W. 836 (1891) ; Advertisers Exchange,
Inc. v. Bleich, 40 Ohio Abs. 212, 57 N.E2d 91 (1943) ; A.B.C. Oil Burner v. Duncan, 28
Del. (Pa.) 528 (Corn. P1. 1939); Ault v. Dustin, 100 Tenn. 366, 45 S.W. 981 (1898);
Sonka v. Chatham, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 312, 21 S.W. 948 (1893) ; Danforth & Co. v. Walker,
40 Vt. 257 (1867) ; Worrell & Williams v. Kinnear Manufacturing Co., 103 Va. 719, 49
S.E. 988 (1905); Nilson v. Morse, 52 Wis. 240, 9 N.W. 1 (1881). See Rock v. Gaede,
111 Kan. 214, 217, 207 Pac. 323, 324 (1922). Cf. Allison Lumber Co. v. Decatur Lumber
Co., 30 Ga. App. 613, 118 S.E. 597 (1923). Massachusetts, although it rejects the antici-
patory repudiation doctrine, see note 5 vupra, also requires an injured seller to halt per-
formance when an unfinished goods contract is repudiated. Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass.
501, 170 N.E. 403 (1930).
119. See cases cited note 118 supra. See also Rockhill Iron & Coal Co. v. City of
Taunton, 273 Fed. 96 (1st Cir. 1921) ; Fail & Miles v. McRee, 36 Ala. 61 (1860) ; see
Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 21 (1900).
120. W. H. Edgar & Son v. Grocers' Wholesale Co., 298 Fed. 878 (8th Cir. 1924);
Lagerloef Trading Co. v. American Paper Products Co., 291 Fed. 947 (7th Cir 1923),
cert. denied, 263 U.S. 706 (1923) ; Rounsaville & Bro. v. Leonard Manufacturing Co., 127
Ga. 735, 56 S.E. 1030 (1907); Hale v. Hess, 30 Neb. 42, 46 N.W. 261 (1890); Wind-
muller v. Pope, 107 N.Y. 674, 14 N.E. 436 (1887); Hart-Parr Co. v. Finley, 31 N.D. 130,
153 N.W. 137 (1915); Sonka v. Chatham, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 312, 21 S.W. 948 (1893);
Knight & Bostwick v. Moore, 203 Wis. 540, 234 N.W. 902 (1931). Cf. Allison Lumber
Co. v. Decatur Lumber Co., 30 Ga. App. 613, 118 S.E. 597 (1923); Palestine Ice, Fuel
& Gin Co. v. Walter Connally & Co., 148 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
121. A repudiated contract represents a "lost opportunity" when its performance would
not have precluded the injured party from entering into similar contracts at the same
time. For cases where the contract was held a "lost opportunity," see, e.g., Hollerbach
& May Contract Co. v. Wilkins, 130 Ky. 51, 112 S.W. 1126 (1908); Olds v. Mapes-Reeves
Construction Co., 177 Mass. 41, 58 N.E. 478 (1900); Canda v. Wick, 100 N.Y. 127, 2
N.E. 381 (1885).
122. See, e.g., Harrington-Ward v. Blomstrom Manufacturing Co., 166 Mich. 276,
131 N.W. 559 (1911); Baessetti v. Shenango Furnace Co., 122 Minn. 335, 142 N.W. 322
(1913); DeMoss v. Beryllium Corp., 358 Pa. 470, 58 A.2d 70 (1948). But see Grinnell
Co. v. Vorhees, 1 F.2d 693 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 629 (1924) (no duty to
obtain new contract since unfair to make plaintiff use "skill, capital and time" for defend-
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The general measure of damages is, therefore, expenses incurred plus lost
profits.12s Any value which the plaintiff retains in work already completed is
deducted;1214 otherwise he would twice recover.12 If defendant retains some
of plaintiff's work, the plaintiff may rescind ;"2 he then recovers the reasonable
value of the property kept by the defendant. And the fact that the plaintiff
would have incurred a loss if the contract had been performed does not reduce
this quantum ineruit recovery.1 7
A small minority of decisions refuses to require cessation of performance
upon repudiation.128 Their rationale is that neither party has the right uni-
laterally to rescind the contract; therefore, the injured party may disregard a
repudiation. Upon completion of the goods, the ordinary contract-market price
difference measure of damages is used. 12 9 If there is no market for the goods,
an action for the contract price is permitted. 30 The number of courts which
allow this rejection of repudiation is decreasing. 131
Uniform SaIcs Act
The Uniform Sales Act has generally been interpreted to require an innocent
seller to mitigate by halting performance when less damages would thereby
result. 32 Most courts apply Section 64(4) to unfinished goods contracts; this
ant's benefit); Allen v. Field, 130 Fed. 641 (2d Cir. 1904), cecr. denied, 201 U.S. 649
(1906) (same).
123. See cases cited notes 11S and 119 supra.
124. See e.g., United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338 (1884) ; General Lamps Manu-
facturing Corp. v. Rader, 43 Berk. (Pa.) 45 (1950); Tufts v. Laurence, 77 Tex. 526, 14
S.W. 165 (1890).
125. For he could then sell or use the work already completed.
126. See, e.g., Brady v. Oliver, 125 Tenn. 595, 147 S.W. 1135 (1911); see United
States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 345 (1884) ; Hosmer v. Wilson, 7 Mich. 294, 301 (1859).
127. Brady v. Oliver, supra note 126.
128. United States v. Burton Coal Co., 273 U.S. 337 (1927) ; John A. Roebling's Sons
Co. v. Lock-Stitch Fence Co., 130 Ill. 660, 22 N.E. 518 (1889); McAllister v. Safeley, 65
Iowa 719, 23 N.V. 139 (1885); Mooney v. Newbern, 5 NJ. Misc. 585, 137 Adt. 567
(1927) ; Barber Milling Co. v. Leichthammer Baking Co., 273 Pa. 90, 116 Ad. 677 (1922).
Burton Coal, supra, illustrates the consequences of permitting completion of perform-
ance. If performance had ceased at repudiation, recovery for lost profits would have been
$46,000; on completion, damages were $450,000. Of course, we do not know whether
plaintiff had already incurred expenses in anticipation of fulfilling the contract. These
expenses would be recovered with the lost profits. See cases cited notes 118 and 119 sutra.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Burton Coal Co., supra note 128; John A. Roebling's
Sons Co. v. Lock-Stitch Fence Co., supra note 128.
130. See e.g., McAllister v. Safeley, 65 Iowa 719, 23 N.WV. 139 (1885); Mooney v.
Newbern, 5 N.J. Misc. 585, 137 At. 567 (1927).
131. No holding of this type has been found in any decision after 1927.
132. Snelling v. Dine, 270 -Mass. 501, 170 N.E. 403 (1930); Lieberman v. Templar
Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923); Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant
Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 At. 519 (1929); Roland & Whytock v. Rex Manufacturing
Co., 49 R.I. 168, 141 At. 310 (1928).
Where both USA §§ 64(3) and 64(4) are inapplicable, i.e. there is no market for the
goods and there will be no substantial saving by halting performance, an action for the
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states that the buyer shall be liable for no greater damages than if the seller
ceased performance immediately upon repudiation. One jurisdiction, however,
limits the application of Section 64(4) to those cases where there is no available
market for the goods.133 This view holds that Section 64(3) is mandatory
whenever there is a market. That section, as previously discussed, 134 computes
the seller's damages, "where there is an available market for the goods," on the
performance date difference between market and contract. This interpretation
seems undesirable. Since Section 64(4) permits the injured seller to recover
all lost profits and expenses, he gains nothing by completing performance after
repudiation. Whether he goes on to incur further expenses, for which he will
be reimbursed, or immediately ceases performance, his overall gain on the con-
tract will still be only the lost profits.135 Furthermore, permitting the plaintiff
to complete performance creates only waste :136 for defendant is compelled to
pay greater damages than necessary in order fully to compensate the plaintiff,
Uniform Co'mnercial Code
Although in substance the UCC also requires the cessation of performance
upon repudiation, by using two ambiguous phrases and a shift of emphasis, it
spreads doubt on this comparatively certain rule. Section 2-704 gives seller
the right to complete the contract "unless in reasonable comnercial judgment
the completion will materially increase the damages."'' 3 Thus, the burden is
placed upon the defendant buyer to prove the seller was commercially unrea-
sonable in deciding to complete the contract.138 This reversal of emphasis is
unwarranted. The repudiation itself should indicate that defendant desires
cessation of performance, and wishes to compute his damages at that point;
if he had wanted plaintiff to complete the contract, and have damages con-
contract price is permitted under § 63(3). See, e.g., Buckman v. Millville Manufacturing
Co., 17 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1927) ; Lannom Manufacturing Co. v. Strauss Co., 235 Iowa 97,
15 N.W.2d 899 (1944).
133. Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 248 Mass. 502, 143
N.E. 312 (1924).
134. See text at notes 76-86 supra.
135. For example, assume a situation where seller's profit on a contract is $1,000,
and his cost of manufacturing is $4,000. If a repudiation occurs prior to commencing per-
formance, seller can sue for the $1,000 lost profits. If he completes performance, incurs
the $4,000 expense, and recovers the $5,000 contract price, his over-all profit is still only
$1,000.
136. See 5 CoRniN, CoNTRAcrs 262-3 (1951) : "[I]f repudiation occurs before full per-
formance by the injured party, .. .his power of earning full payment by completing his
own performance is gone. This is because the completion of his performance will cause
economic waste."
Of course, where society needs the goods, there will be no waste to society. For if
there is sufficient demand, the manufacturer will not discard the unfinished goods lie re-
tains, but will complete the performance to cover a new contract.
137. UCC § 2-704 (emphasis added).
138. Contrary to this UCC section, all cases cited note 118 supra state that the seller
of unfinished goods must halt performance upon repudiation of the contract. This is spoken
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puted as of performance date, there would have been no need to repudiate.
Furthermore, the inclusion of "materially increase" adds uncertainty, particu-
larly when combined with "reasonable commercial judgnmcnt."'30 These phrases
may enable a revengeful plaintiff to continue performance knowing that the
damages are thus aggravated. And they provide the good faith plaintiff with
no greater protection than he obtains by ceasing performance. 40
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Insurance policies are often the subject of an anticipatory repudiation action.
For example, the insurance company may cancel the policy on the ground that
the insured misrepresented an essential fac 141 The insurer may then tender
back the premiums already paid. And it will certainly refuse to accept further
premiums.'- Another common occurrence is where the insurer, claiming that
the insured is no longer disabled, halts the payment of benefits under a dis-
ability insurance policy. 4 3 It will then notify the insured that premiums must
again be paid in order to continue the policy. In all such cases, the insured
faces the dilemma of choosing the correct method of testing the validity of the
insurer's position.
Upon an anticipatory repudiation of an insurance contract, the insured usually
prefers an immediate damage action. Practical considerations make this
more desirable than a suit after performance date. For in order to preserve
his claim until performance date, the insured may have to make regular tender
of premiums. 4 4 More important, the security for which he contracted is then
of as an absolute requirement, subject to proof by the seller that damages were not en-
hanced by continuing performance. In fact, the buyer wvas given the burden of proving
that less damages would have been incurred if the seller continued performance. Rockhill
Iron & Coal Co. v. City of Taunton, 273 Fed. 96 (1st Cir. 1921).
TExAs LEGIsLA=va CouxcrL, ANALIxslS OF ARnac. 2 OF Tm UCC 226 (1953) recog-
nizes that the seller's rights are broadened by this section.
139. UCC § 2-704 (emphasis added).
Speculation about damages based upon a future market is obviously less certain than
a determination of whether "labor or expense of material amount" is still necessary to
perform the contract. The latter can be made with comparative assurance; for the seller
need only know whether added expenses of more than de minhnis amount are still required
to complete the contract. However, under the UCC formula, the seller may complete
unless, in crystal-gazing, he predicts that the market will be so poor at completion time
as to cause considerable enhancement of damages.
140. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Cobb v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 565, 51 P2d 84 (1935);
Speer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. 36 Hun (N.Y.) 322 (1S35) ; Grand Lodge Brother-
hood of R-R. Trainmen v. Martin, 218 S.W. 40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
142. See, e.g., Mutual Relief Ass'n v. Ray, 173 Ark. 9, 292 S.W. 396 (1927).
143. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pool, 189 Ark. 101, 71 S.V2d 455
(1934) ; Donlen v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 117 Misc. 414, 192 N.Y. Supp. 513 (Sup. Ct.
1921) ; Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 203 N.C. 767, 167 S.E. 38 (1932).
144. For decisions pointing out the insured's duty to tender premiums in order to
keep the contract alive, see, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551 (1904);
Day v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 480 (1878); Langan v. Supreme
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no longer present. 145 For example, where a life insurance policy is involved,
his beneficiary receives only a lawsuit at performance date.' 40 And if the courts
find that the insurer correctly canceled the policy, it will be too late to remedy
the error. Repudiation of a disability insurance policy presents additional prob-
lems to an insured. Repudiation there usually occurs on the insurer's notifying
the insured that it will refuse to pay future disability benefits. 147 Without
accepting the repudiation, the insured can test the validity of the insurer's re-
fusal to pay by suing for the next installment when due. But this action will
not be res judicata as to the insurer's further duty to perform.148 Thus, the
insured may be compelled to sue for each installment as it becomes due. 14 9
Because of these burdens and the resultant insecurity, an insured usually pre-
fers an immediate action for all damage incurred.
Yet, a substantial number of courts do not permit an immediate damage
action. 50 These courts apply a strict contract rationale and therefore refuse
to alter the contract, which was solely a promise to pay money at a specified
Council American Legion of Honor, 174 N.Y. 266, 66 N.E. 932 (1903). But ef. Wayland
v. Western Life Indemnity Co. 166 Mo. App. 221, 148 S.W. 626 (1912).
145. See, e.g., Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Lovejoy, 149 S.W. 398, 405 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1912) ; "By the breach . . . the insured . . . not only loses the assurance which lie
thought he had..., but he has been lulled into a sense of security, his activity in procuring
other insurance at a time when he was an insurable risk has been stifled, and he awakes
when too late to avoid it to find that he has no insurance .... "
146. It is doubtful that any insured or beneficiary would feel secure with this knowl-
edge. Without discussing this factor, the New York Court of Appeals, however, in Langan
v. Supreme Council of American Legion of Honor, 174 N.Y. 266, 66 N.E. 932 (1903),
thought this expectation was sufficient security.
147. See cases cited note 143 supra.
148. See, e.g., United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Dempsey, 193 Ark. 204, 98 S.W.2d
943 (1936) (first trial) ; 197 Ark. 221, 122 S.W.2d 170 (1938) (second trial after insurer
again refused payments of benefits). See also Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 203 N.C.
767, 167 S.E. 38 (1932). However, the disability finding may be res judicata if the total
disability is, in view of modern scientific knowledge, permanent, Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Berryhill, 69 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (loss of use of hand and foot),
or if the insurance policy requires continued benefits after the insured is once totally
disabled, John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Large, 230 Ala. 621, 162 So. 277 (1935).
149. For a striking illustration of the harassment and trouble this may cause the
insured, see the two decisions in United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Dempsey, supra
note 148. The court in the first trial held that the insured was totally disabled, but refused
to permit recovery of all future benefits. It granted judgment for the benefits due on
December 1, 1936. Subsequently, in the early part of 1937, the insurer again ceased pay-
ing benefits, alleging no disability. Presumably in need of funds, the insured settled out of
court for a smaller sum than actually due him. When the insurer remained obstinate,
the insured was required to sue again; but he recovered only the installments then due.
If the insurer is even more obstinate than the defendant in Dempsey, one court stated
that it would find some remedy. See Cobb v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 565,
51 P.2d 84 (1935). Furthermore, the requirement of more than one suit to determine
disability may add to already clogged dockets. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Large, 230 Ala. 621, 162 So. 277 (1935).
150. Life insurance policies: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936)
(alternate holding); Kelly v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N.Y. 16, 78 N.E. 584
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future time.15 1 As a consequence of this view, the life insurance beneficiary
retains only a law suit; and the disability-insured may have to sue for each
installment when due.
To remedy the inequity of prohibiting an immediate damage action, some
of these courts grant specific performance.15 2 In what is, in effect, a declaratory
judgment action, the insurer is ordered to pay the insurance benefits when due.
Thus, specific performance is more satisfactory than a performance date suit,
for it grants the insured the security for which he bargained. But it still de-
prives him of the more adequate relief afforded by an immediate damage suit.
Not only does he receive no money in hand, but he is also compelled to maintain
a contractual relationship that is strained due to litigation caused by the in-
surer.
153
(1906); Grand Lodge Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Martin, 218 S.AV. 40 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919).
Disability insurance policies: United States v. Worley, 281 U.S. 339 (1930); Hines v.
Fidelity _Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. N.Y. 1934) ; Parks v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 59 F2d 736 (W.D. Mo. 1932) ; Erreca v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 383, 121
P2d 689 (1942) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 51 Ga. App. 393, 180 S.E. 640 (1935) ;
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Goble, 254 Ky. 614, 72 S.V.2d 35 (1934) ; Melancon v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 176 La. 1055, 147 So. 346 (1932) ; Rishmiller v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 192 Minn. 348, 256 N.V. 187 (1934) ; Allen v. National Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 228 Mo. App. 450, 67 S.W.2d 534 (1934) ; Robbins v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 155 Misc.
384,278 N.Y. Supp. 144, aff'd, 242 App. Div. 816,275 N.Y. Supp. 645 (1st Dep't 1934) ; Green
v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 203 N.C. 767, 167 S.E. 38 (1932) ; Mid-Continent Life Ins.
Co. v. Christian, 164 Okla. 161, 23 P.2d 672 (1932).
Massachusetts, which rejects the anticipatory repudiation doctrine, of course refuses
an immediate action upon repudiation of an insurance policy. Porter v. Supreme Council
American Legion of Honor. 183 Mlass. 326, 67 N.E. 238 (1903).
151. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 51 Ga. App., 393, 395, 180 S.E. 640, 641
(1935) ;Langan v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 174 N.Y. 266, 269, 66
N.E. 932, 933 (1903); 'Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Christian, 167 Okla. 161, 163.4,
23 P.2d 672, 675 (1932).
152. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Large, 230 Ala. 621, 162 So. 277 (1935);
Brix v. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co., 18 P.2d 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933); Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Goble, 254 Ky. 614, 72 S.AV.2d 35 (1934) ; Melancon v. Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 176 La. 1055, 147 So. 346 (1932) ; Kelley v. Security Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 186 N.Y. 16, 78 N.E. 584 (1906) ; Cf. Bass v. Life & Annuity Ass'n, 96 Kan.
205, 150 Pac. 588 (1915) ; See Supreme Council American Legion of Honor v. Jordan, 117
Ga. 808, 810, 45 S.E. 33, 34 (1903). Merrick v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 124
Wis. 221, 226, 102 N.V. 593, 594 (1905).
153. See Kelly v. Security Mlutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N.Y. 16, 27, 78 N.E. 584, 5893
(1906) (dissenting opinion).
In contrast with this insurance rule, upon breach of a sales contract the injured party
is usually not required to accept another offer from the repudiator; he is held to have
the right to say that he has no faith that defendant will fulfill his obligations. See Canadian
Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
Furthermore, a specific performance action requires the insured to engage in litigation
merely to reinstate his policy. Wayland v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 166 Mo. App. 221,
148 S.W. 626 (1912).
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Other courts disallow even this specific performance action. 1 4 Insurance
benefits, they argue, are always contingent upon a future occurrence. There-
fore, any decree ordering future performance would be uncertain in time and
amount. And as all judgments must be definite, 1' 5 these courts permit the
insured to recover only already due installments.
While prohibiting specific performance is certainly unreasonable, limiting
the insured to this remedy is counter to equity-law distinctions.'8 0 A legal
remedy is not usually denied because there is an adequate remedy in equity;
rather, it is the equitable remedy that is denied when there is an adequate
remedy at law.15 7 Yet here, some courts grant specific performance instead of
an available and adequate legal remedy-damages. They reason that this en-
forces the contract as written. But, absent special circumstances requiring
equity jurisdiction, no courts apply this rationale in other contract cases. For
example, if a seller refuses to deliver a ton of coal to his buyer, no court would
order the delivery even though that would give the buyer the coal for which he
contracted. 58 Instead, he would be left to his damage remedy. No special
reasons appear to require a different rule here.
Even where an anticipatory repudiation action is permitted, 18 courts are
reluctant to find a repudiation; instead, a repudiation is sometimes labeled only
154. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Simmons, 190 Ark. 480, 79 S.W.2d 419
(1935); Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 203 N.C. 767, 167 S.E. 38 (1932).
155. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Simmons, supra note 154; see, generally,
30 Am. Juin, Judgments § 20 (1940).
156. O'Neill v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 70 N.J.L. 410, 57 Atl.
463 (1904). See also Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Penn., 173 Miss. 93, 161 So. 681
(1935); Merrick v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N.W. 593
(1905).
157. O'Neill v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, supra note 156; see
MCCLINTOCK, EQuITY 47 (2d ed. 1948).
158. See, generally, id. at 149.
159. Life insurance policies: Mutual Relief Ass'n v. Ray, 173 Ark. 9, 292 S.W. 396
(1927); Bass v. Life Annuity Ass'n, 96 Kan. 205, 150 Pac. 588 (1915); Wollmnan v.
Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 231 Mo. App. 36, 95 S.W.2d 645 (1936) ; O'Neill v.
Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 70 N.J.L. 410, 57 Atl. 463 (1904) ; Speer
v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 36 Hun (N.Y.) 322 (1885); American Ins. Union v.
Woodward, 118 Okla. 248, 247 Pac. 398 (1926) ; Pack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178
S.C. 272, 182 S.E. 747 (1935); Protective Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n v. Duke, 91 S.W,2d
753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Clemmitt & Wife v. New York Life Ins. Co., 76 Va. 355
(1882) ; Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wash. 2d 541, 104 P.2d 310 (1940) ; Merrick
v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N.W. 593 (1905) ; Cf. Watson
v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (repudiation held
present material breach of promise to give continuous insurance protection) ; see Indiana
Life Endowment Co. v. Carnithan, 62 Ind. App. 567, 579, 109 N.E. 851, 854-5 (1915).
Disability insurance policies: Williams v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n,
100 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pool, 189 Ark. 101,
71 S.W.2d 455 (1934); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 99 Ind. App. 590, 193
N.E. 690 (1935); Levy v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 420, 2 A.2d 341
(1938); McLaughlin v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 216 S.C. 233, 57 S.E.2d 411
(1950); Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 129 Tex. 344, 102 S.W.2d 405
(1937). Cf. Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, I. & R.R., 173 U.S. 1 (1899); Caminett v.
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an erroneous use of defenses under the contract.SGO Thus, courts have denied
an action for anticipatory repudiation when an insurer canceled on the ground
of a claimed misrepresentation 101 or an alleged failure to pay premiums," -' or
where the insurer refused to pay disability benefits. 163 This would never occur
in an action on any other contract. To illustrate: S contracts to sell gouds to B
on sixty days credit, and ships them to B. After inspecting the goods, B refuses
to accept them, alleging that they are non-conforming. This is certainly a good
defense under the contract. Yet, if B erroneously uses this defense-if the
goods are actually conforming-S can sue immediately for damages for breach
of contract. That B is willing to be bound by the contract if the goods are
actually conforming is of no avail. For the court would decide that B's mistake
was a breach of contract. 64 Similarly, an immediate damage action should be
permitted for erroneous use of defenses under an insurance contract.1
The measure of damages for anticipatory repudiation of an insurance policy
is uncertain only because courts fail to distinguish between damages and the
recovery in a rescission action. 00 An injured party always has the option to
rescind a repudiated contract. 167 He then recovers all premiums paid for which
he has received no consideration.0 8 In a damage suit, the recovery is quite
Manierre, 23 Cal. 2d 94, 142 P.2d 741 (1943) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lancaster, 51 G.
App. 390, 130 S.E. 641 (1935). See also Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rasctte, 12 F.2d 93
(6th Cir. 1926), disapproved, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas 297 U.S. 672 (1936).
However, this right to an action for anticipatory repudiation of a disability insurance
policy is rapidly becoming more and more theoretical. See cases cited note 160 infra, and
accompanying text.
160. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Dempsey, 197 Ark. 21, 122 S.W2d 170 ( 193);
Englehart v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 195 S.WV2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) . See
also Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 295 U.S. 632 (1935); Kimel v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1934) ; Box v. 'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Ala.
447, 168 So. 220 (1935) ; Cobb v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal2d 5, 51 P2d 84
(1935); Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Reed, 54 Ind. App. 450, 103 N.E. 17 (1913);
Rishmiller v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 Minn. 348, 256 N.W. 187 (1934).
These decisions have been cited by one commentator as authority that "[ilt is clear
that the insurer which claims, although erroneously, that the insurance is nut . . .
disabled... does not.., incur liability" for an anticipatory repudiation. VnCE, Ixslt-
ANCE 357 (3d ed. 1951). While the trend away from allowing an anticipatory repudiation
action on a disability insurance policy does seem to be gaining momentum, the cases cited
note 159 supra are still good law, i.e., when a repudiation is found, an immediate action for
all damages is permitted.
161. See Cobb v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 160.
162. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936).
163. See Rishmiller v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 Minn. 348, 256 N.W. 187 (1934).
164. See, e.g., Baesseti v. Shenango Furnace Co., 122 Minn. 335, 142 N.W. 322 (1913).
165. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 187 Ark. 398, 60 S.W2d 912 (1933);
Protective Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n v. Duke, 91 S.,.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
166. See Rogers v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins., 182 S.C. 51, 188 S.E. 432 (1931);
Illinois Bankers' Life Assurance Co. v. Garrison, 48 S.V.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
167. See, e.g., Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Baber, 168 Tenn. 347, 79 S.W2d 30 (1935);
Mutual Relief Ass'n v. Ray, 173 Ark. 9, 292 S.Wy. 396 (1927); Levy v. Mastachu~etts
Accident Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 420, 2 A2d 341 (1938).
168. Capital City Benevolent Society v. Travers, 4 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Unity
19541
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
different. On a disability insurance policy, the insured should recover the
present value of all future benefits based on his life expectancy. 109  If the sub-
ject of a life insurance policy is still insurable, the additional amount necessary
to maintain a similar insurance policy should be recovered.170 If no longer in-
surable, the amount recoverable should be the face value of the policy, less
premiums that would have been paid through the insured's life expectancy,
both separately discounted to the date of recovery. 71 These methods fully
compensate the insured for his loss. 7 2
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Considerable difference of opinion exists over the extent to which the antici-
patory repudiation doctrine is applicable to employment contracts. 17a The in-
Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 64 Ga. App. 277, 13 S.E.2d 32 (1941); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W.
v. Penn, 173 Miss. 93, 161 So. 681 (1935) ; McLaughlin v. Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men, 216 S.C. 233, 57 S.E.2d 411 (1950) ; Grand United Order of Odd Fellows v. Massey,
87 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
There is disagreement, however, over whether the time that the insurance policy
was in effect constitutes consideration for the premiums paid. Compare Lovell v. St. Louis
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 U.S. 264 (1884) (consideration), with Life & Casualty Co. v.
Baber, 168 Tenn. 347, 79 S.W.2d 36 (1935) (no consideration). Since the insured was
protected during that period, the better view is that this was consideration.
169. Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, I. & R.R., 173 U.S. 1 (1898) ; Federal Life Ins. Co. v.
Rascoe, 12 F. 2d 693 (6th Cir. 1926), disapproved on otrer grounds, New York Life Ins,
Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936); Williams v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident
Ass'n, 100 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1938) ; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Whitfield, 186
Ark. 198, 53 S.W.2d 10 (1932); Caminetti v. Manierre, 23 Cal. 2d 94, 142 P.2d 741
(1943) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Day, 145 Ga. 425, 89 S.E. 576 (1916) ; Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 99 Ind. App. 570, 193 N.E. 690 (1935) ; Universal Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 129 Tex. 344, 102 S.W.2d 405 (1937).
If the insured is not permanently disabled, the period of the disability will have to be
approximated. This should present no undue difficulty; for precisely the same thing is
done in computing tort damages.
170. Speer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 36 Hun (N.Y.) 322 (1885); Pack v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 S.C. 272, 182 S.E. 747 (1935); Universal Life Ins. Co.
v. Binford, 76 Va. 103 (1882) ; Merrick v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 124 Wis,
221, 102 N.W. 593 (1905); Cf. Bass v. Life & Annuity Ass'n, 96 Kan. 205, 150 Pac. 588
(1915) ; see Watson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 673, 677 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 746 (1943).
171. Speer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 36 Hun (N.Y.) 322 (1885) ; American
Ins. Union v. Woodward, 118 Okla. 248, 247 Pac. 398 (1926); Protective Mutual Life
Ins. Ass'n v. Duke, 91 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Franklin v. Northern Life
Ins. Co., 4 Wash. 2d 541, 104 P.2d 310 (1940); Merrick v. Northwestern National Life
Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N.W. 593 (1905); Clemmett & Wye v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 76 Va. 355 (1882); cf. Wayland v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 166 Mo. App.
221, 148 S.W. 626 (1912).
172. And the insurer cannot complain. See O'Neill v. Supreme Council American
Legion of Honor, 70 N.J.L. 410, 413, 57 At1. 463, 465 (1904): " 'The man who wrongfully
renounces a contract into which he has deliberately entered cannot justly complain if he is
immediately sued for a compensation in damages by the man whom he has injured .... 'o
(quoting from Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678 (1853)).
173. See American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 Fed. 774 (9th Cir. 1921).
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jured party is usually granted the option to accept or disregard the repudia-
tion up to the date performance is supposed to commence.'7 4 Most courts re-
fuse to apply the doctrine beyond that date.1 7a Instead, they label the repudia-
tion a present breach on the ground that the repudiation joined with a present
refusal to perform is a material breach of contract. 170 But the difference be-
tween a repudiation joined with a present refusal to perform and a repudiation
prior to the date on which performance is to commence is not sufficient to
warrant this distinction. A simple example illustrates this lack of substantial
difference: M contracts to employ S from July 1, 1954 to June 30, 1956. If .1
repudiates on June 30, 1954, this is labeled an anticipatory repudiation. But if
the repudiation occurs only 24 hours later, these courts call it a present breach.
Yet, any recovery by S will still be almost entirely for M's repudiation of his
promise to pay salary for the one year and 364 days in the future. In fact,
if S were interested only in the present breach, i.e., the refusal to allow him
to work on July 1, 1954, it is doubtful that he would ever bother to bring
suit.177 Logically, therefore, if the injured party is allowed the option to accept
or disregard the repudiation in one of these fact situations, he should be per-
mitted this option in the other.'78
174. See, e.g., Sarle v. School District No. 27, 32 Ariz. 96, 255 Pac. 994 (1927) ; Old
Ladies Home Ass'n v. Hall, 212 Miss. 67, 52 So. 2d 650 (1951) ; Tate v. School District
No. 11, 324 Mo. 477, 23 S.W.2d 1013 (1929).
175. Taylor v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 136 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1943); Granow v. Adler,
24 Ariz. 53, 206 Pac. 590 (1972); Wood v. Girot, 102 Cal. App. 160, 2S2 P.c. 9SI
(1929) ; Ogden-Howard Co. v. Brand, 7 Boyce (Del.) 482, 10 At. 277 (1919) ; Doh-rty
v. Schipper & Block, 260 Ill. 128, 95 N.E. 74 (1911); Richardson v. The Eagle IMachine
Works, 78 Ind. 422 (1881); Harrington v. Empire Cream Separator Co., 120 Me. 383,
115 Ati. 89 (1921); Hippodrome Co. v. Lewis, 130 Aid. 154, 100 At. 78 (1917); M.-
Cullen v. Dickinson Co., 60 Min. 156, 62 N.V. 120 (1895); Tate v. Schcol District
No. 11, 324 fo. 477, 23 S.V.2d 1013 (1929); Brown v. Cowles, 72 Neb. S96, 101 XAV.
1020 (1904) ; 'Meyers v. Potoker, 3 N.J. Misc. 450, 128 Adt. 601 (1925) ; James v. 11oard
of Commissioners of Allen Co., 44 Ohio St. 226, 6 N.E. 246 (1886) ; Ditzler Dry Goods
Co. v. Sanders, 44 Okla. 678, 146 Pac. 17 (1915); Smith v. Pallay, 130 Ore. 282, 279
Pac. 279 (1929); Menihan Co. v. Hopkins, 129 Tenn. 24, 164 SAV. 775 (1914); Niles v.
Parsons, 239 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Virginia Talc & Soapstone Co. v.
Hurkamp, 124 Va. 721, 98 S.E. 681 (1919) ; Jameson v. Board of Education, 78 W. Va.
612, 89 S.E. 255 (1916); see Bufkin v. Baird & Roper, 73 N.C. 283, 292 (1875).
Contra (injured party allowed option to sue immediately or to avait completion of
performance; the latter is sometimes labeled the Constructive Service Doctrine) : Ameri-
can Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 Fed. 774 (9th Cir. 1921); Russell v. Barnes Foundation,
52 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1943), aff'd, 143 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.), cert. detifed, 323 U.S.
771 (1944) ; S. Blumenthal & Co. v. Bridges, 91 Ark. 212, 120 S.AV. 974 (1909) ; Pallardy-
Watrous Ins. Agency v. M6. Tucker Inc., 120 Fla. 895, 163 So. 234 (1935); Moore
v. Kelley & Jones Co., 111 Ga. 371, 36 S.E. 802 (1900); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich.
62 (1883); Hollwedel v. Duffy-11ott Co., 263 N.Y. 95, 188 N.E. 266 (1933) (cites an-
ticipatory repudiation cases as authority) ; Allen v. Colliery Engineers' Co., 196 Pa. 512,
46 Ati. 899 (1900) ; Sistare v. People's Supply Co., 87 S.C. 171, 69 S.E. 152 (1910). See
Marx v. Miller, 134 Ala. 347, 351, 32 So. 765, 766 (1902).
176. See cases cited note 175 supra.
177. The expense of litigation would make such a suit prohibitive.
178. For a critical discussion of this alleged distinction, see e.g., Roehm v. Horst,
178 U.S. 1, 19 (1900); O'Neill v. Supreme Council American Legion of Hunor, 70 N.J.L
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Disagreement over when an injured party may sue is a necessary corollary
of this supposed distinction between an anticipatory repudiation and a present
breach. If defendant's conduct is labeled an anticipatory repudiation, the in-
jured party may accept the repudiation and sue immediately for all damages.1 10
Or he may choose to await each performance date, treating each due install-
ment as a separate cause of action.180 On the other hand, those courts which
characterize the repudiation as a present breach at the time performance was
to begin hold that the sole cause of action then accrues.181 And a majority
permits an immediate suit by the injured party for all damages incurred. 18 -
However, a substantial minority allows recovery of only those damages in-
410, 57 Atl. 463 (1904). Professor Williston, however, defends the distinction. 5 WIL-
LIS5oN, CoNTRAcrs § 1317 (rev. ed. 1936).
Some courts have used the label anticipatory repudiation for an action by an employee
discharged during performance. See, e.g., Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 52 F. Supp. 827
(E.D. Pa. 1943), aff'd, 143 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1944); In re Paramount Publix Corp., 85
F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Pallardy-Watrous Ins. Agency v. M. Tucker, Inc., 120 Ma. 895,
163 So. 284 (1935).
179. American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 Fed. 774 (9th Cir. 1921) ; Russel v. Barnes
Foundation, 52 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1943), aff'd, 143 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 771 (1944) ; Sarle v. School District No. 27, 32 Ariz. 96, 255 Pac. 994 (1927) ;
S. Blumenthal & Co. v. Bridges, 91 Ark. 212, 120 S.W. 974 (1909); 'Morrison v.
Sycamore Canyon Gravel Co., 102 Cal. App. 536, 283 Pac. 84 (1929); Pallardy-
Watrous Ins. Agency v. M. Tucker Inc., 120 Fla. 895, 163 So. 284 (1935); Moore
v. Kelley & Jones Co., 111 Ga. 371, 36 S.E. 802 (1900) ; Rayburn v. Comstock, 80 Mich.
448, 45 N.W. 378 (1890); Hollwedel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 263 N.Y. 95, 188 N.E. 206
(1933); Allen v. Colliery Engineers' Co., 196 Pa. 512, 46 Atd. 899 (1900); Sistare v.
People's Supply Co., 87 S.C. 171, 69 S.E. 152 (1910).
180. S. Blumenthal & Co. v. Bridges, supra note 179; Moore v. Kelley & Jones Co.,
supra note 179; Ga Nun v. Palmer, 202 N.Y. 483, 96 N.E. 99 (1911); Werner v.
Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154 N.Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dep't 1915); Allen v. Colliery
Engineers' Co., supra note 179; Sistare v. People's Supply Co., supra note 179; cf. Russel
v. Carver, 208 Ala. 219, 94 So. 128 (1922).
181. See cases cited note 175 supra.
182. Taylor v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 136 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1943) ; Ransome Concrete
Machinery Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (2d Cir. 1922) ; Granow v. Adler, 24 Ariz. 53, 206
Pac. 590 (1922); Wood v. Girot, 102 Cal. App. 160, 282 Pac. 981 (1929); Viall v. Lionel
Manufacturing Co., 90 Conn. 694, 98 Atl. 329 (1916); Ogden-Howard Co. v. Brand,
30 Del. (7 Boyce) 482, 108 Ad. 277 (1919) ; Hazen v. Cobb, 96 Fla. 151, 117 So. 853 (1928) ;
Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 53 N.E. 181 (1899) ; Bridgeford & Co. v. Meagher, 144
Ky. 479, 139 S.W. 750 (1911); Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64 (1877); Hippodrome
Co. v. Lewis, 130 Md. 154, 100 At. 78 (1917) ; Edwards v. Slate, 184 Mass. 317, 68 N.E.
342 (1903); Webb v. Depew, 152 Mich. 693, 116 N.W. 560 (1908); Prichard v. Martin,
27 Miss. 305 (1854) ; Tate v. School District, 324 Mo. 477, 23 S.W.2d 1013 (1930) ; School
District of Omaha v. McDonald, 68 Neb. 610, 94 N.W. 829 (1903) ; Davis v. Dodge, 126
App. Div. 469, 110 N.Y. Supp. 787 (2d Dep't 1908); James v. Board of Commissioners of
Allen County, 44 Ohio St. 226, 6 N.E. 246 (1886); Ditzler Dry Goods Co. v. Sanders, 44
Okla. 678, 146 Pac. 17 (1915) ; Quick v. Swing, 53 Ore. 149, 99 Pac. 418 (1909) ; Allen
v. Colliery Engineers' Co., 196 Pa. 512, 46 At]. 899 (1900); Sistare v. People's Supply
Co., 87 S.C. 171, 69 S.E. 152 (1910) ; Helfferich v. Sherman, 28 S.D. 627, 134 N.W. 815
(1912); Menihan Co. v. Hopkins, 129 Tenn. 24, 164 S.W. 775 (1913); G. A. Kelly
Plow Co. v. London, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 208, 125 S.W. 974 (1910); Virginia Talc &
Soapstone Co. v. Hurkamp, 124 Va. 721 (1919); Jameson v. Board of Education, 78
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curred prior to the date of trial.183 This view seems to rest on the theory that
plaintiff's damages cannot be estimated in advance.' 84 It is surprising that
this should trouble a court, for in all anticipatory repudiation actions courts
may grant recovery prior to the date of performance.1sa
Where a court labels the repudiation a present breach, the doctrine of res
judicata often deprives plaintiff of full compensation.18 0 . For example, a wrong-
fully discharged employee may sue for one already due installment, in the belief
that the anticipatory repudiation doctrine allows him to sue at each installment
date.187 If, after recovering the accrued installment, he later sues for a second
installment or for damages on the entire contract, a court may hold that the
repudiation plus the initial refusal to permit the employee to perform con-
stituted a material breach. Therefore, only one cause of action arose. And the
employee's prior suit for just one salary installment is then res judicata to any
further recovery on the same cause of action. 8 The same difficulty also exists
where the court permits immediate suit only for damages accrued up to the
trial date; even though the recovery was limited by the court, the plaintiff,
having once litigated, cannot again bring suit. 8 9
In those jurisdictions where the cause of action immediately accrues but
recovery is limited to damages suffered up to the trial date, the statute of
limitations may combine with the res judicata doctrine to make full recovery
impossible. If the jurisdiction's statute of limitations is shorter than the dura-
tion of the contract, plaintiff must bring an action prior to the contract's termi-
W. Va. 612, 89 S.E. 255 (1916). Cf. S. Blumenthal & Co. v. Bridges, 91 Ark. 212, 120
S.W. 974 (1909).
183. Schroeder v. California Yukon Trading Co., 95 Fed. 296 (N.D. Calif. 1S99);
Darst v. fathieson Alkali Works, 81 Fed. 284 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1,96); .Mar-, v. Miller,
134 Ala. 347, 32 So. 765 (1902) ; Van Winkle v. Satterfield, 58 Ark. 617, 25 S.W. 1113
(1894); Dumas v. Dumas, 84 Ga. App. 265, 66 S.E.2d 129 (1951); Mt. Hope Cemetery
v. Weidenman, 139 Ill. 67, 28 N.E. 834 (1891); McMullen v. Dickinson Co., 60 Minn.
156, 62 N.W. 120 (1895) ; Robinson v. McAlhaney, 216 N.C. 674, 6 S.E.2d 517 (1940) ;
Niles v. Parsons, 239 S.W.2d 740 (Ten. Civ. App. 1951); Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis.
355 (1859) ; cf. Brown v. Cowles, 72 Neb. 896, 101 N.V. 1020 (1904).
184. See, e.g., Van Winkle v. Satterfield, supra note 183.
185. See, e.g., L. Hand, J. in Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Paciic Ry., 244 Fed.
485, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff'd, 250 Fed. 327 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 672
(1918); "It is true that the [repudiator's] obligation is changed from a series in the
future to a gross sum down, but that is a consequence... from his breach, which is a
wrong and within his own choice"
186. See, e.g., Doherty v. Schipper & Block, 250 Ill. 128, 95 N.E. 74 (1911); Rich-
ardson v. The Eagle Machine Works, 78 Ind. 422 (1831); James v. Board of Cummis-
sioners of Allen County, 44 Ohio St 226, 6 N.E. 246 (1&36); Jameson v. Board of
Education, 78 IV. Va. 612, 89 S.E. 255 (1916). But see Werner v. Werner, 169 App. Div.
9, 154 N.Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dep't 1915).
187. This will often occur where the employee hopes to regain his job. He may
be in immediate need of funds. Or he may desire to test the validity of the discharge
without accepting the repudiation.
188. See cases cited note 186 supra.
189. See, e.g., Darst v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 81 Fed. 284, 2M7 (C.C.W.D. Va.
1896); Van Winkle v. Saterfield, 58 Ark. 617, 622, 25 S.W. 1113, 1114 (1894). See also
CLARK, CODE PL.EADING 472-9 (2d ed. 1947).
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nation date ;190 otherwise, the statute will bar recovery. But if he sues prior
to the termination date, no recovery will be allowed for damages to be incurred
subsequent to the trial date; and both the statute of limitations and res judicata
will prevent commencing a later suit.'9' Elimination of this dilemma is re-
quired.
Despite their disagreement over the label to be applied to an anticipatory
repudiation of an employment contract, all courts agree on the formula for
computing whatever damages are granted. An injured employee may recover
the contract price (salary) for the period being sued upon less any amount he
might reasonably earn during that part of the period left free by the repudia-
tion.192 Any expenses saved must also be deducted. 193 The employee, of course,
has the option to rescind the entire contract and recover the reasonable value
of services already rendered. 94 An injured employer may recover the differ-
ence between the contract price and what he must pay a similar employee. 193
LEASE CONTRACTS
Where a lease is treated as outside the purview of the executory limitation,
the injured lessor 196 may rescind, 19 7 or sue immediately for damages, or await
190. See, e.g., Taylor v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 136 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1943); see
Granow v. Adler, 24 Ariz. 53, 57, 206 Pac. 590, 593 (1922) ; Wood v. Girot, 102 Cal. App.
160, 163, 282 Pac. 981, 983 (1929) ; Lichtenstein v. Brooks, 75 Tex. 196, 198, 12 S.W,
975 (1899).
191. Plaintiff will have split his cause of action; therefore, the first recovery will be
a bar to his second action. See cases cited note 186 supra. Also, the statute of limitations
will have run, since his cause of action accrued as of the initial breach. See cases cited note
190 supra.
192. See cases cited notes 175, 179, 182, and 183 supra.
However, in the few jurisdictions in which the injured employee is permitted to stay
idle and sue only when installments are due, he may recover the full salary. S. Blumen-
thai & Co. v. Bridges, 91 Ark. 212, 120 S.W. 974 (1909) ; Moore v. Kelley & Jones Co.,
111 Ga. 371, 36 S.E. 802 (1900) ; Allen v. Colliery Engineers' Co., 196 Pa. 512, 46 Atl.
899 (1900) ; Sistare v. People's Supply Co., 87 S.C. 171, 69 S.E. 152 (1910). This "con-
structive service" doctrine is rapidly losing the little support it had. See, e.g., Ogden-
Howard Co. v. Brand, 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 482, 485, 108 Atl. 277, 279 (1919) ; Doherty v.
Schipper & Block, 250 Ill. 128, 95 N.E. 74, 75 (1911).
193. See, e.g., School District of Omaha v. McDonald, 68 Neb. 610, 94 N.W. 829
(1903) ; Dunn v. Allen, 55 App. Div. 637, 67 N.Y. Supp. 218 (4th Dep't 1900).
194. See, e.g., Kimes v. Davidson Inv. Co., 101 Cal. App. 382, 281 Pac. 639 (1929);
Clark v. Manchester, 51 N.H. 594 (1872); Tipple v. Tipple, 189 App. Div. 28, 177
N.Y. Supp. 813 (3d Dep't 1919) semble.
195. See, e.g., Brown v. Cowles, 72 Neb. 896, 101 N.W. 1020 (1904); Silbert v.
Katz, 151 N.Y. Supp. 510 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1915).
196. This comment will not discuss the remedies of an injured lessee upon a repudia-
tion by his lessor. The lessee may, if he fulfills the jurisdiction's statutory requirements,
sue for possession. See, generally, 2 PowE.L, REAL PoPER'Y § 227 (1950). Or the
lessee may sue for damages computed on the difference between the rent agreed upon and
the actual rental value at the time of repudiatiorL See, e.g., Rainwater v. McGrew, 181
S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
197. To rescind, the lessor need only accept the surrender of the premises. However,
this rule leads to difficulties for the lessor who does not wish to rescind but who desires
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the performance date. 98 Courts often hold that a lease is an executory bi-
lateral contract by finding that the lessor has impliedly promised to protect the
lessee's quiet enjoyment.19  Therefore, the lease is not within the executory
limitation. Another method used is to label the repudiation plus the failure to
pay one installment a present material breach of the lease.200 In such cases,
the lessor may recover the difference between the lease price and the present
rental value in an immediate action.2 0' Thus, mitigation through rerental is
required.2 02 But if the lessor refuses to accept the repudiation, while there is
scattered holding to the contrary,2 0 3 he is usually under no duty to mitigate.-34
The lessor then cannot sue for any installment until it is due.203
to mitigate by reletting; reletting, even if verbally for the benefit of the repudiator, may
be considered an acceptance of the surrender. See, e.g., Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice
Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388, 56 N.E. 903 (1900). Some courts hold that reletting creates
only a presumption of recission; this may ba rebutted by evidence that the lessor notified
the lessee that he was not thereby accepting the surrender. See, e.g., Underhill v. Collins,
132 N.Y. 269, 30 N.E. 576 (1892). Still others treat the reletting as only one evidentiary
fact to be considered. See, e.g., McGrath v. Shalett, 114 Conn. 622, 159 At. 633 (1932).
198. Hawldnson v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724 (Sth Cir.), cert. den.ed, 314 U.S. 694
(1941) ; it re Afullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 635
(1916); Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., 54 F.2d 92 (E.D. Mich. 1931), damages computed,
57 F.2d 340 (E.D. Mich. 1932) ; Shea v. Leonis, 29 Cal. App. 2d 184, 34 P.2d 277 (1938) ;
Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 10 Aft. 464 (1935); Williams v. Aeroland
Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114, 20 So. 2d 346 (1944) ; Benson v. Iowa Bake-Rite Co., Z07 Iowva 410,
221 N.W. 464 (1928) ; Brown v. Cairns, 63 Kan. 534, d6 Pac. 639 (1901); Minneapolis
Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 74 Minn. 93, 76 N.V. 1024 (1S93); Godfrey v. City of
Beatrice, 51 Neb. 272, 70 N.W. 914 (1897); South Main Akron v. Lynn Realty, 106
N.E2d 325 (Ohio Ct App. 1951); Conner v. Warner, 52 Okla. 630, 152 Pac. 1116 (1915);
Early v. Isaacson, 31 S.V2d 515 (Te3. Civ. App. 1930); California Bldg. Co. v. Drury,
103 Wash. 577, 175 Pac. 302 (1918).
199. See, e.g., Hawdinson v. Johnston, 122 F2d 724 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 694 (1941); South Main Akron v. Lynn Realty, 106 N.E.2d 325 (Ohio CL App.
1951).
200. See, e.g., In re Edgewood Park Junior College, 123 Conn. 74, 192 At. 561 (1937).
201. Hawklnson v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941);
In re Mullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 635 (1916) ; Leo
v. Pearce Stores Co., 57 F.2d 340 (E.D. Mich. 1932) ; Shea v. Leonis, 29 Cal. App. 2d 184,
84 P.2d 277 (1938) ; Hinde v. Madansky, 161 Ill. App. 216 (1911) ; Brown v. Cairns, 63
Kan. 584, 66 Pac. 639 (1901); Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 74 Minn. 93, 76
N.V. 1024 (1898) ; Merrill v. Willis, 51 Neb. 162, 70 N.W. 914 (1897) ; Armijo v. Pettit,
32 N.M. 469, 259 Pac. 620 (1927) ; Ralph v. Deily, 293 Pa. 90, 141 At. 640 (1928) ; Early
v. Isaacson, 31 S.V.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159
Pac. 89 (1916). Cf. Palmer v. Connecticut Ry., 311 U.S. 544 (1941) (999 year lease re-
pudiated; only 11 years damages allowed since remainder too speculative).
202. The lessor's damages are computed as if he had relet the premises.
203. Walsh v. Shinner, 20 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1927) ; Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., 57 F.2d
340 (E.D. Mich. 1932); Hinde v. Madansky, 161 IlL App. 216 (1911); Benson v. Iowa
Bake-Rite Co., 207 Iowa 410, 221 N.W. 464 (1928) ; Lips v. Opp, 150 Kan. 745, 96 P2d
865 (1939).
204. In re Mullings Clothing Co., 252 Fed. 667 (D. Conn. 1918); Rice v. Dudley, 65
Ala. 68 (1880) ; Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 74 S.W.2d 640 (1934) ; Shea v. Leonis.
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A substantial number of courts deny an action for anticipatory repudiation
of a lease.20  Some of these courts view a lease as only a unilateral promise to
pay money and therefore within the executory limitation.207 Others reject the
anticipatory repudiation doctrine because they find, not an absolute promise to
pay rent, but a promise that is contingent on possession.208 This disregards
the fact that the lessee promises to pay for possession whether or not he occupies
the premises. And furthermore, in the same case, courts have permitted an
action for anticipatory repudiation of a promise to purchase or renovate the
leased premises. 20 0 No objection is then raised that these promises are con-
tingent upon possession.
Mitigation by rerental should be required of a lessor after repudiation by the
lessee. In no other contract can the injured party increase his damages by
wasting available property freed by the repudiation. And in no other contract
is it more certain that a party will not later withdraw his repudiation. For one
who abandons premises does not often return.
CONCLUSION
Strict freedom of contract, with few exceptions, has regulated the develop-
ment of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine. Once parties contract, neither
29 Cal. App. 2d 184, 84 P.2d 277 (1938) ; McGrath v. Shalett, 114 Conn. 622, 159 At. 633
(1932) ; Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114,20 So. 2d 346 (1944) ; Jordon v. Nickell,
253 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952) ; Lirette v. Sharp, 44 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 1950) ; Mer-
rill v. Willis, 51 Neb. 162,70 N.W. 914 (1897) ; Zucker v. Dehm, 128 N.J.L. 435,26 A.2d 564
(1942) ; Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876) ; Milling v. Becker, 96 Pa. 182 (1880) ; Gold-
man v. Broyles, 141 S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) ; Crowder v. Virginia Bank, 127 Va.
299, 103 S.E. 578 (1.920).
205. See, e.g., Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., supra note 204, Jordon v. Nickell, supra
note 204.
206. First National Bank of Chicago v. First National Bank of Wheaton, 78 F.2d 502
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 651 (1935) ; It re Marshall's Garage, 63 F.2d 759 (2d
Cir. 1933) ; In re McAllister-Mohler Co., 46 F.2d 91 (S.D. Ohio 1930); Rice v. Dudley,
65 Ala. 68 (1880) ; Cerrute v. Burdeck, 130 Conn. 284, 33 A.2d 333 (1943); People v. West
Town State Bank, 373 Ill. 106, 25 N.E.2d 509 (1940) ; Jordon v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d 237
(Ky. Ct App. 1952) ; Cooper v. Casco Mercantile Trust Co., 134 Me. 372, 186 Atl. 885
(1936) ; Leon v. Barnsdall Zinc Co., 309 Mo. 276, 274 S.W. 699 (1925) ; Willis v, Kronen-
donk, 58 Utah 592, 200 Pac. 1025 (1921) ; cf. Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333, 162
N.E. 97 (1928). See Giesy v. American National Bank of Portland, 31 F. Supp. 524, 525
(D. Ore. 1940) ; It re Barton Co., 34 F.2d 517, 518 (D.N.H. 1929). Since the lessor may
sue only for the rent as due, no mitigation is required here. Jordon v. Nickell, supra.
207. First National Bank of Chicago v. First National Bank of Wheaton, supra note
206; Cerrute v. Burdick, supra note 206; Kroch v. B.G. Operating Co., 286 Ill. App. 301,
3 N.E.2d 285 (1936) (alternate holding) ; Jordon v. Nickell, supra note 206; Leon v. Barns-
dall Zinc Co., supra note 206.
208. In. re Marshall's Garage, 63 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1933); In re McAllister-Mohler
Co., 46 F.2d 91 (S.D. Ohio 1930) ; Calechman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 120
Conn. 265, 180 AtI. 450 (1935) ; Cooper v. Casco Mercantile Trust Co., 134 Me. 372, 186
Atl. 885 (1936) ; cf. People v. West Town State Bank, 373 II1. 106, 25 N.E.2d 509 (1940).




party can alter the contract unless the other consents.210 The non-repudiating
party may agree to the repudiation; but until he does, the contract still exists,
despite the fact that the injured party would be fully compensated if he im-
mediately accepted the repudiation. Furthermore, confusion over when to com-
pute damages has resulted from the doctrine's development. Since words of re-
pudiation cannot alter a contract, freedom of contract requires computation of
damages only at the agreed-upon performance date.2 "1 Yet acceptance of the
repudiation could be interpreted as an agreement to change the damage com-
putation date. And the ever-present duty to mitigate increases the possible
alternatives.
In order to dispel this miasma of confusion, the anticipatory repudiation
doctrine should be based on two policies: 1) a contracting party's right to ade-
quate assurance of performance (security) ; and 2) the injured party's right
to full compensation, but no more than full compensation.
Security and adequate compensation can both be achieved only by altering
the anticipatory repudiation doctrine.2  Upon repudiation, all contractual
duties should be discharged, leaving the parties to their legal remedies. And
damages should be computed as of the date of repudiation.
The proposed treatment of an anticipatory repudiation will give the injured
party complete security.213 If plaintiff were required to treat repudiation as a
present breach, he could recontract with someone he believes would fulfill the
contract. He has no such assurance when he retains a contractual relationship
with a repudiator; he is certain only of a future law suit.
210. See, e.g., Callan v. Andrews, 48 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1931) ; McAllister v. Safeley,
65 Iowa 719,23 NAV. 139 (1885).
211. See, e.g., John Dimon Corp. v. Federal Sugar Refinery Co., 215 App. Div. 140,
213 N.Y. Supp. 106 (1st Dep't 1925).
212. Cf. Illinois Central R.R. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 64 (1930): "we perceive no advan-
tage to be gained from an adherence to a rigid uniformity, which would justify sacrificing
the reason of the rule, to its letter .... It may be discarded and other more accurate means
resorted to.. .. "
213. The right to this sense of security is recognized as a reason for contracting. See
Roelm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) ; Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F2d 724, 729 (Sth
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941) ; UCC § 2-609, comment 1; Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?, 40 YALE L.J. 704,727 (1931).
The lack of security under present case law is especially apparent where the repudiation
is caused by the bankruptcy of one party. Some courts hold that petitioning a contracting
party into bankruptcy is sufficient to prove repudiation. Muehlstein & Co. v. Hickman, 26
F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1928). Others hold that a repudiation occurs only when the trustee or
receiver disaffirms the contract. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York Ry., 198 Fed. 721,
735 (2d Cir. 1912). Until the trustee decides, the injured party must remain ready to per-
form. Samuels v. E. F. Drew & Co., 286 Fed. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff'd, 292 Fed. 734
(2d Cir. 1923). If Bankruptcy Act § 70b, 30 STAT. 565, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110(b)
(Supp. 1952), is applicable, the trustee must decide within sixty days or the contract is
held disaffirmed. Otherwise, if the decision is not made within a reasonable time, the court can
order that the choice be made. Ibid. But if the trustee disaffirns the contract, the repudiation
is held to have occurred at the date the petition in bankruptcy was filed. And though the in-
jured party could not have recontracted at that time since he had to remain ready to per-
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And the injured party will obtain full compensation.2 14 His recovery will be
the difference between the contract price and recontract price following repudia-
tion. The injured party will thus receive performance of the same promises
for which he contracted, and for the same consideration.215
If the injured party is fully compensated, he can raise no objection to this
suggested modification of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine. Of course he
is thus held to have recontracted at a time prior to the performance date despite
the fact that he never expressly accepted this duty. But injured parties in all
breaches of contract are held to duties for which they never contracted. For
example, a buyer does not contract for the duty to find a new seller upon a
present breach. Yet the law, in order to minimize the loss, computes damages
as if he had done so. 2
16
Nor can defendant object to a rule which treats his repudiation as a present
breach. He is only being taken at his word.217 After all, the repudiating party
has the real option. He can silently await the performance date and then cause
a present breach. Or he can announce his repudiation prior to the performance
date. Many factors may influence his choice. But once it is made, it should
be accepted.
To avoid evidentiary problems of proving a repudiation,218 SectioQ 2-609 of
the Uniform Commercial Code should be used. It will also give the injured
party an opportunity to convince the repudiator to continue the contract. 1 9
form, his damages are computed as of that date. In re Portage Rubber Co., 296 Fed. 289
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 604 (1924). For only claims accrued on the date of the
petition in bankruptcy may be brought against the bankrupt's estate. Bankruptcy Act § 63,
30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. 1952). Furthermore, if for some
reason the jurisdiction does not permit an action for anticipatory repudiation of the contract
involved, the innocent party gets no remedy whatsoever. First National Bank of Chicago
v. First National Bank of Wheaton, 78 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 651
(1935).
214. "Full compensation" has always been considered the correct measure of damages.
See, e.g., Weed v. Lyons Petroleum Co., 294 Fed. 725 (D. Del. 1923), aff'd, 300 Fed. 1005
(3d Cir. 1924) ; Kingman & Co. v. Western Manufacturing Co., 92 Fed. 486 (8th Cir. 1899);
Baessetti v. Shenango Furnace Co., 122 Minn. 335, 142 N.W. 322 (1913).
215. See, e.g., L. Hand, J., in New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transportation Corp.,
34 F.2d 653, 654 (2d Cir. 1929) : "Damages never do more than restore the injured party to
the position he would have been in, had the promisor performed . . . ." See also Roehm v.
Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900).
216. See 5 CORBIN, CONMACrS § 1039 (1951).
217. See Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, 690 (1853): "It seems strange that
the defendant, after renouncing the contract, and absolutely declaring that he will never
act under it, should be permitted to object that faith is given to his assertion, and that an
opportunity is not left to him of changing his mind." For similar statements, see Rochm v.
Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) ; Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Pacific Ry., 244 Fed. 485,
504 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff'd, 250 Fed. 327 (2d Cir. 1918).
218. See the discussion of this evidentiary problem in note 7 supra.
219. See note 89 supra for an illustration of the problem faced, under present case law,
by a contracting party who attempts to convince his repudiator to continue performance:
by such action he might be held to have repudiated the contract.
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Plaintiff, if he is not certain of the defendant's absolute repudiation,2 ° could
thereby request adequate assurance of performance. If such assurance is not
forthcoming within a reasonable time, the plaintiff would be required to miti-
gate. And damages would be computed as of that date.
Only one exception to the rule of immediate damage computation must be
retained. If the repudiator prevents mitigation by the injured party, damages
should not be computed until the latter is able to mitigate. Thus, a buyer may
pay for goods in advance. If seller repudiates, but refuses to refund the pur-
chase money, buyer should not be compelled to expend new funds for the same
purchase. He should be permitted to do so, and have damages computed on
that repurchase. But a duty to mitigate should arise only when the money is
refunded.2 1
Undoubtedly, revision of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine will be opposed
on the ground that it will serve as an incentive to repudiation.' For the re-
pudiator will thereby avoid further risks in a fluctuating market. But so long
as the injured party can find someone to incur subsequent market risks, no
harm is done. -And, while this may give unearned security to an unscrupulous
repudiator, most repudiations are not made in bad faith.-2  The overwhelming
number occur because a responsible businessman has made a mistake, or changed
his plans. He should be permitted to avoid an undesirable obligation with a
minimum of damages. Furthermore, an injured party will almost always pre-
fer to receive advance notice of a refusal to perform ;=- this gives him time to
recontract with someone who will perform.
Immediate computation of damages will add both certainty and justice to this
confused field of law.
220. Or if he desires to attempt to convince the repudiator to complete performance.
221. See, e.g., West v. Pritchard, 19 Conn. 212 (1848). Cf. Perkins v. Minford, 235
N.Y. 301, 139 N.E. 276 (1923).
222. See, e.g., Fahey v. Updike Elevator Co., 102 Neb. 249, 252, 166 N.V. 6A2, 623
(1918); Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951),
modified on other grounds, 199 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1952).
223. See, e.g., Robson & Evans v. J.R. Hale & Sons, 139 Ga. 753, 78 S.E. 177 (1913)
(buyer repudiates when market price of similar contract higher than contract price). See
also HOLmES, COLLECTED LrGAL PAPEs 167 (1920); HoLmtrs, THEr CoMnox LAW 300
(1881). Contra: Lagerloef Trading Co. v. American Paper Products Co., 291 Fed. 947 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 706 (1923).
224. See, e.g., Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 694 (1941) : "The real sanctity of any contract rests only in the mutual willingness
of the parties to perform. Where this willingness ceases to exist, any attempt to prolong or
preserve the status betveen them will usually be unsatisfactory and mechanical. Generally
speaking, it is far better in such a situation, for the individuals and for society, that the
rights and obligations between them should be promptly and definitely settled .... The
commercial world has long since learned the desirability of fixing its liabilities and losses
as quickly as possible, and the law similarly needs to remind itself that, to be useful, it too
must seek to be practical." See also UCC § 2-609, comment 1.
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